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1 The First Chapter: Introduction
During my doctorate studies, I got particularly interested in financial and in-
formation economics. I started the first project with my co-author G. Trigilia
who helped me to understand deeper many concepts from mechanism design.
The joint work is presented in the second chapter. My interest in information
economics and information design led me to the second project which I did on
my own. The third chapter is devoted to the problem of information design in
a competitive environment. Below I present abstracts of these two projects.
1.1 Strategic default, investment and the resolution of fi-
nancial distress
In recent years, the U.S. experienced an increase in the share of default events
that are resolved out-of-court, as well as a reduction in bankruptcy-related costs.
This trend raises the question as to what drives the frequency with which de-
faults turn into bankruptcies. We propose a theory based on three pillars: first,
bankruptcy is costlier than out-of-court restructuring; second, creditors can-
not commit to take defaulting borrowers to court; third, firms have private
information about the value of their assets, outside investors only learn them
only upon bankruptcy. Creditor’s bargaining power upon default decreases with
bankruptcy costs and it increases with the frequency of strategic default – that is,
default by firms which could have honored their obligations. When bankruptcy
costs decrease, creditors obtain higher recovery rates out-of-court and therefore
firms have lower incentives to default strategically. As a result, bankruptcy can
occur less frequently.
1.2 Communication Mechanisms in Competition
I examine how a market mediator can help market players to have an incentive
compatible communication which leads to a more efficient market outcome. I
introduce the mediator whose function is a collection of financial information
from the players and sharing this information with other market players. The
crucial assumption is that information disclosure to the mediator by the partic-
ipants is voluntary, so there is no third party who forces the market players to
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disclose private information. Given that the mediator can commit to a reporting
policy to the bidders, I characterise the information reporting policy that the
mediator should adopt to minimize the probability of investment in unprofitable
projects by the uninformed players. I show that manipulation of the first order
beliefs of the uninformed player is not sufficient to extract information from
the informed player. The main insight of the paper suggests that allowing the
player who shared information to know the degree to which his information was
shared with other participants will incentivise information disclosure.
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2 The Second Chapter: Strategic default, Invest-
ment and the Resolution of Financial Distress
2.1 Introduction
In recent years, private restructuring of distressed securities witnessed a come-
back in the U.S., surging from 10% of default events around 2007 to 40% in
2016.1 The trend coincided with an increasingly faster and less costly bankruptcy
procedure - a legal process through which entities who cannot repay debts to
creditors may seek relief from their debts. For instance, the average Chapter 11
bankruptcy case took seven months to resolve in 2017, less than half than that
of 2013.2 How to reconcile a negative relation between bankruptcy-related costs
and the use of bankruptcy as a means to resolve financial distress episodes? Is it
consistent with the view that private restructuring out-of-court is the response
to costly bankruptcy (e.g., Jensen (1991)). And more generally, what could be
driving different types of default resolutions across firms and jurisdictions?
We provide a tentative answer to these questions in a model where firms
are heterogeneous in their solvency probabilities, and operate in environments
characterized by two key parameters: a risk-free rate and a bankruptcy cost.3
Firms borrow from competitive investors under symmetric information, but two
frictions arise afterwards: (i) the borrower privately observes the realized return
on the invested capital, while others can observe it only when bankruptcy takes
place; (ii) investors cannot credibly commit that they will take defaulting firms
to court: all parties knows that upon default they will decide whether or not to
restructure their claims out-of-court. As a result, the securities issued induce
a Bayesian game played after returns realize, in which borrowers have some
bargaining power vis à vis their lenders until they miss a payment.
1See Moody’s ‘A Closer Look at Distressed Exchanges’ (2017). The International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA) 2014 Master Agreement, which sets standards for credit
default swap contracts, includes in a ‘default event’ both in-court and out-of-court resolutions
of distress. Similar broad definitions are adopted by credit rating agencies, such as Moody’s,
Fitch and Standard & Poor’s.
2See Reuter’s Ever-shorter U.S. bankruptcies have creditors scrambling, February 2017.
3Introducing additional default costs which do not depend on whether bankruptcy occurs
or not would not have any qualitative effect in our model; we normalize such costs to zero. As
a consequence, our bankruptcy cost could also be interpreted as capturing any incremental
loss of firm value accruing when out-of-court restructuring fails and bankruptcy takes place.
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For a given capital structure, the incentives to reject an out-of-court reor-
ganization plan and take a defaulting firm to court increase with the expected
recovery rate from bankruptcy, which depends positively on the expected value
of the creditor’s claims upon default, and negatively on bankruptcy costs. In
turns, the expected value of the creditor’s claims upon default depends on the
odds that default is strategic – that is, that the defaulting firm could have hon-
ored its obligation – as opposed to being due to insolvency. The higher these
odds are, the higher the expected value of the creditor’s claims upon default
and the stronger the incentive for creditors to resolve distress episodes in court.
Our first result is that optimal securities provide incentives for borrowing
firms to strategically default on their debts, even if this is anticipated at the
investment stage and if other feasible securities could have prevented strategic
default from taking place (or reduce its incidence). Strategic default is optimal
because it increases the expected recovery rate, alleviating the limited commit-
ment problem faced by the creditors, who cannot commit that they will take
defaulting borrowers to court.
At the extensive margin, the marginal firm that invests defaults strategically
with positive probability. For this firm, investment would be impossible absent
strategic default, because bankruptcy costs are larger than the recovery rate
under truth-telling. At the intensive margin, the frequency of strategic default
depends on the probability that firms are solvent in a non-monotonic fashion.
Locally, more profitable firms are less likely to default strategically. However,
there exists a profitability threshold at which the probability of strategic default
jumps up, before declining again. The intuition behind this regime shift is
as follows. As firms’ profitability rises, the effect strategic default has on the
dollar value of the equilibrium out-of-court restructuring plan offered by the
borrowers compounds, because the probability that borrowers are in a high state
conditional on them reporting a low state mechanically rises. That is, the set
of out-of-court restructuring plans that creditors can credibly enforce without
destroying incentives ex post expands. So, the highest incentive compatible
credit spread rises, enabling the creditors to break even at a lower bankruptcy
probability – i.e., accepting more often the out-of-court plan – and lowering the
deadweight losses.
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Empirically, strategic default accounts for some of the cross-sectional varia-
tion in recovery rates. The US regulated utilities offer a recent example. Accord-
ing to Moody’s, they “experienced an average recovery rate of approximately 90
percent. This high recovery rate is likely driven by utilities’ often observed be-
havior of strategically choosing to default, when asset values are still relatively
high, in order to seek rate relief from regulators”.4 Favara et al. (2012) ar-
gue that firms in countries that favor shareholders in reorganization have lower
equity betas due to strategic default. Garlappi and Yan (2011) find a man-
ifestation of strategic default in the fact that shareholders’ recovery is often
positive. Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) find that strategic default affects
credit spreads especially for risky firms facing high liquidation costs.5 Blouin
and Macchiavello (2017) document frequent strategic default by firms in devel-
oping countries.6 Finally, the empirical literature on recovery rates established
that the frequency of recovery rates is bimodal, with large mass on extreme
(high or low) recoveries, and little mass for intermediate recoveries, which is
consistent with the presence of strategic default.7
Through our characterization of optimal strategic default, we pin down the
expected default frequency and the frequency with which default is resolved
out-of-court, both of which are now endogenous. This is in contrast with both
credit risk models (e.g., Fan and Sundaresan (2000) and Davydenko and Stre-
bulaev (2007)), where the Coase theorem holds and it is assumed that private
renegotiation fails some of time for exogenous reasons, and with previous models
of default resolution under asymmetric information (e.g., Giammarino (1989)),
where contracts are exogenous and so is the probability of default. We will
discuss at length these differences in the literature review of Section 2.2.
4Quote from Moody’s Ultimate Recovery Database Special Comment, issued in April 2007.
Importantly, utilities strategically default because of limited commitment by the regulator,
who could not commit to give no “rate relief”. Our paper is about private creditors, not
regulators, but the underlying commitment issues are similar.
5Interestingly, they observe that strategic default increases both default probabilities and
recovery rates, which may justify its relatively low effect on credit spreads for investment
grade firms.
6Recent work also documents strategic default in the mortgage market. Gerardi, Herken-
hoff, Ohanian, and Willen (2017) find that 30% of mortgage payers who defaulted after the
2008 crisis were acting strategically. The magnitude is consistent with both Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales (2013) – who also find variation across social groups – and Artavanis and Spyri-
dopoulos (2018) – who show that financial and legal sophistication positively affect strategic
default rates.
7See both Schuermann (2004) and Altman and Kalotay (2014).
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Contrary to the argument in Jensen (1991), optimal securities induce a fre-
quency of private resolutions of default that decreases with both bankruptcy
costs and the risk-free rate. The intuition is that higher bankruptcy costs re-
duce the maximum cash flows that can be extracted by creditors out-of-court,
which feeds back into lower incentive compatible repayment outside of default
(or credit spread). In turns, lower credit spreads and higher haircuts out-of-court
imply lower return to the creditors, who need more frequent bankruptcies to be
willing to invest in the firm. We formally show in the main text that, locally,
the probability of private resolution of default is decreasing with bankruptcy
costs.8 Because this comparative static is with respect to bankruptcy costs, not
to its degree of creditors’ friendliness, it relates to Ponticelli and Alencar (2016),
who study patterns of default across more or less congested courts in Brazil, or
to Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2008), who find that richer countries
take less to resolve default and save the going concern 75% of the times, against
the 17% of the times of lower income countries.9
Turning to credit spreads, we show that they monotonically increase in both
the risk-free rate and the bankruptcy costs. The risk-free rate affects spreads
both directly (because they are defined as returns to creditors outside default
net of the risk-free rate), and indirectly, as a higher risk-free rate implies a
higher opportunity cost of funds for the creditors. The indirect effect always
dominates: transferring a risky dollar from the borrower to the creditor comes
at a deadweight cost, and so it is more expensive that transferring a risk-free
dollar. As for bankruptcy costs, the effect is similar and it is due to the larger
wedge between a risk-free dollar and a risky dollar that a wider bankruptcy
cost brings about. Both effects are consistent with the evidence about credit
spreads.10
Finally, our model has implications for the distribution of recovery rates
conditional on a type of default event. Out-of-court, recovery rates fall with
8See Lemma 6 and Corollary 2 in the main text of this chapter.
9However, it does not directly relate to Claessens and Klapper (2005) finding that link
creditors’ friendliness of bankruptcy regimes to bankruptcy use.
10Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) attribute around three quarters of the cross-sectional
variation in firms’ CDS spreads to default risk. Estimates of the cost of default conditional on
default happening range around 20-25% of firm value, but due to selection bias these defaults
should be more likely to have a low default cost. For the average firm, Glover (2016) estimates
that they could be as high as 45%.
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bankruptcy costs, because these costs measure the inverse of creditors’ bargain-
ing power upon default. Higher costs imply weaker creditors’ bargaining power
and therefore higher equilibrium haircuts observed out-of-court. As for recov-
eries in bankruptcy, there are two distinct effects. On the one hand, higher
bankruptcy costs mechanically lower recovery rates, because they increase the
deadweight losses. On the other, changes in bankruptcy costs induce endogenous
changes in the incentives for borrowers to strategically default, which might more
than offset the former effect. Indeed, we find that recoveries in bankruptcy are
non-monotonic, and they are the lowest for intermediate ranges of bankruptcy
costs, as in these ranges strategic default never occurs. These predictions are – to
the best of our knowledge – new in the literature, and could explain what drives
the hump-shaped (bimodal) recovery rates cross-sectional distribution.11 In our
model, recovery rates out-of-court are higher than recovery rates in court, on
average, which is consistent with the evidence. For instance, Moody’s observes
that ‘the recovery rate averages 70% for senior unsecured bonds in a distressed
exchange compared with 40% in a bankruptcy default. A likely explanation is
that companies that initiated distressed exchanges were under less credit stress
than those that underwent payment defaults or bankruptcies’.12
Because in our baseline model creditors can contract on payment both in and
out-of-court, and are only limited in their ability to commit to bankrupt default-
ing firms, we extend our model to cover cases where commitment problems are
more severe, and payments outside of bankruptcy are all subject to potential
renegotiation. As in Gale and Hellwig (1989), now multiple equilibria may arise
and they are sustained by some arbitrary off-equilibrium belief system. We con-
centrate attention to the set of equilibria that can be implemented by a uniform
off-equilibrium belief that a deviation comes from the high type. We will discuss
how and when this is with loss of generality. Our main results are qualitatively
unchanged in this extension, but there are two important differences. First, now
the equilibrium strategic default is always the minimum required for investment
11See especially Gilson, John, and Lang (1990), Schuermann (2004), Jankowitsch, Nagler,
and Subrahmanyam (2014) and Altman (2006).
12Large differences exist also across types of bankruptcy, as shown by Bris, Welch, and Zhu
(2006) in a comparison of Chapter 7 liquidation against Chapter 11 reorganization in the US.
See also Bernstein, Colonnelli, and Iverson (2016). Internationally, Davydenko and Franks
(2008) find that the median recovery rate is 92% in the UK, 67% in Germany, and 56% in
France.
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to be sustainable. Second, optimal securities are not necessarily fully collater-
alized. The intuition is that there is now a tight link between credit spreads
and collateral values both in and out of default states, and so fully-collateralized
securities might bring about excessively high credit spreads, which can only be
sustained by higher-than-optimal frequency of bankruptcy.
A final extension of our model addresses issues related to the cardinality
of the type space. In particular, it asks whether our results are robust to the
introduction of additional states, and whether strategic default incentives are
monotone in the type space. Due to the many constraints and the complex
non-linear behavior of our objective function, it is very hard to derive ana-
lytic properties of the solution for models with more than two states of nature.
Therefore, we resort to numerical simulations. Our main results are as follows.
First, deadweight losses and credit spreads are increasing function of the risk-
free rate and the bankruptcy cost, confirming the findings from the baseline
model. Second, strategic default takes place at the optimal contracts. Interest-
ingly, though, it is not monotonic in the firm’s returns: firms with high realized
returns might default more often than firms with intermediate returns. This
sheds some light on the many complications involved in solving our model, and
further clarify why we insist on a relatively simple version that can be fully
derived and understood analytically.
2.2 Related literature
The relevant theoretical work can be divided, with the cost that comes with
simplification, in two streams. We partition our literature review accordingly.
Security design. The most relevant work is in security design and optimal
contracting. Starting with Townsend (1979), Costly-State-Verification (CSV)
papers have emphasized imperfect observability of returns as an important con-
cern driving firms’ capital structure choices, and provides a micro-foundation
to bankruptcy as certification. In the original CSV model, creditors have full
commitment power and verification is deterministic. The model has been ex-
tended to random verification by Border and Sobel (1987) and Mookherjee and
Png (1989), and to limited commitment by Gale and Hellwig (1989), Khalil and
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Parigi (1998) and Krasa and Villamil (2000).
Gale and Hellwig (1989) considered a CSV model with exogenous recovery
rates from verification. In contrast, we have fixed investment and endogenous
recovery rates. Khalil and Parigi (1998) focus on variable investment and fully
mixed equilibria, in the spirit of inspection games. In contrast, we have fixed
investment and we show that the optimal contract may involve no strategic
default (i.e., partial mixing). Krasa and Villamil (2000) consider a different
game where both parties pay out-of-pocket for bankruptcy ex post, and they
allow for side payments. They show that deterministic verification is optimal,
and when limited commitment does not bind the optimal contract resembles
straight debt.13 In contrast, our optimal allocation is implemented by random
verification (generically) and this is what induces strategic default in equilib-
rium.
Interestingly, the development of credit derivatives, and in particular credit
default swaps, inspired a recent literature that studies how the incentives for
borrowers and lenders to renegotiate their debts in-court, as opposed to out-of-
court. As Bolton and Oehmke (2011) show, credit default swaps strengthen the
bargaining power of creditors ex post and therefore might improve investment
conditions. They also might generate an overinsurance problem, though, so a
trade-off arises. Unlike Bolton and Oehmke (2011), we do not assume that out-
of-court restructuring is costly, and that it makes future cash flows verifiable. In
our case, when the firms negotiate out-of-court the value of the assets is never
observed by outsiders. Only when bankruptcy takes place, is the value revealed
to outsiders (and the court), either due to liquidation at market prices or due
to the extensive disclosure requirements that come with bankruptcy filings.
A related, though distinct literature applies static games to the analysis of
renegotiation upon default. Giammarino (1989) first emphasized that asymmet-
ric information at the renegotiation stage could be an important determinant of
the frequency of out-of-court restructuring, as opposed to in-court bankruptcies.
However, Giammarino takes the initial securities issued as given, and therefore
is subject to the Lucas critique. In contrast, we consider optimal securities and
13With one important difference from Townsend: while in Townsend messages are direct,
and this is without loss of generality because of the revelation principle, Krasa and Villamil
(2000) sustain their optimal debt by an indirect message space that contains just two messages:
default or no-default.
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derive predictions on this frequency based on deep parameters of the economy.
This is important, especially as Davydenko and Franks (2008) document large
differences in private contracting across countries: weaker creditors’ protection
correlates with larger collateralization and shorter maturity. François and Raviv
(2017) propose a different direction, emphasizing heterogeneous beliefs about the
results of a formal restructuring plan and about judicial discretion as potential
sources of the different outcomes of default events. In our model, beliefs are
symmetric.
Credit risk models. An alternative stream of literature, which has arguably
been more central in deriving empirical predictions about strategic default, de-
velops structural models of credit risk. Merton (1974) replicates risky debt by
a portfolio of risk-less debt and a put option, linking default risk explicitly to
the volatility of a firm’s return. This approach implies that default probabilities
are inversely related to recovery rates, which does not necessarily happen in our
model due to strategic default. Leland (1994) introduces endogenous default
boundaries, default-related costs and strategic default in Merton’s style struc-
tural models. The boundary is pinned down by a smooth-pasting condition.
Importantly, there is no uncertainty about the value of the firm’s asset upon
default: the boundary is public information. In contrast, our results are entirely
driven by the asymmetry of information ex post between insiders and outsiders.
Given the empirical regularity that borrowers strategically default on their
debts, it is not a surprise that structural credit risk models considered the con-
sequences of strategic default on credit spreads. In particular, Fan and Sun-
daresan (2000) build strategic default opportunities in a Leland (1994) type
model. Strategic default is incentivized by the possibility of out-of-court rene-
gotiation, which allows the parties to save on bankruptcy costs. Because the
parties have symmetric information at the renegotiation stage, the Coase theo-
rem holds and we should never observe bankruptcy in equilibrium in this type
of model, which is counterfactual. To rule out this outcome, these models as-
sume that with some exogenous probability renegotiation fails.14 An important
contribution of our paper to this literature is to offer a model that makes this
14See also the Appendix to Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007), Favara, Schroth, and Valta
(2012) and Antill and Grenadier (2017).
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probability endogenous. The cost of making this probability endogenous is that,
while we derive several comparative static predictions, we lose the quantitative
implications these models have. We hope that future work can bridge this gap.
2.3 Setup
A Borrower (B) is endowed with a project, and seeks financing from a creditor
(C). Both parties are risk-neutral. The project requires $1 to be implemented,
and yields return x̃ ∈ {L,H}. C has an alternative investment opportunity that
yields a risk-less return r. Let L < r < H, so that the project is risky and losses
occur in the low state.15 Let Pr.[x̃ = H] ≡ p ∈ (0, 1). B privately observes
the realized state x; does not observe the realized state, but can verify it at an
exogenous cost µ ≥ 0. The timing of the game is as follows:
t=0 B issues securities, trying to sell them to C, who is competitive
– If C buys the securities, the proceedings of $1 get invests it in the
project. Investment is assumed to be an observable and verifiable
action
– Otherwise, the game ends. B has a payoff equal to zero, whereas C
invests the dollar at the risk-free rate of return r
t=1 B privately observes the realized return x, and publicly reports it to be
m ∈ {L,H}.16 B can randomize the report she makes about the state.
The associated contractual payments from B to C are denoted by the
function sm : {L,H} → R.17 C has two options:
– To accept the report and receive the payment sm, in which case B
retains a payoff equal to x− sm and there are no deadweight losses
15We choose to work with a binary state space for two reasons. First, because we want to
allow for stochastic monitoring and – later on – limited commitment, which are hard to handle
with more than two states. Second, because we are interested in the comparative statics of
the problem, which cannot be fully determined with more states. See Border and Sobel (1987)
and Mookherjee and Png (1989).
16As there are only two states, the restriction to direct messages is without loss of generality.
No communication corresponds to the case where, regardless of the realized x, both types are
expected to send the same message m.
17We think of s(·) as describing both: (i) the face value of debt in the high state; (ii) the
restructured value of C’s claims in the low state.
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– To reject the payment and verify the state x at a cost µ. After
verification, C can enforce payments based on both the report m and
the true state x, denoted by the function c : {L,H}2 → R. In the
event of verification, B receives a payoff of x − cm,x while C obtains
cm,x − µ. Whenever two subscripts are used, the first refers to the
message m and the second to the state x.18
We restrict attention to contracts that satisfy limited liability, namely such that
0 ≤ sm ≤ m and 0 ≤ cm,x ≤ x, for all m and x. We label such contracts as
feasible.
We denote the probability that the creditors take a defaulting borrower to
court (i.e., they verify the state) at t − 1 by the function bm : M → [0, 1].
Notice that creditors are allowed to randomize their verification decision. This
possibility was not explicitly considered in Townsend (1979), and was introduced
in costly-state-verification models by Border and Sobel (1987) and Mookherjee
and Png (1989). Random verification will be central in the derivation of all our
main results. Before proceeding to the analysis, it is useful to define what a
credit spread and a recovery rate are in our setup.
Definition 1. Given a risk-free rate r and a repayment from B to C when the
firm does not default sH , corporate Credit Spreads (CS) are denoted by:
CS := sH − r.
Definition 2. Given a bankruptcy cost µ, an out-of-court repayment from B to
C upon default sL, and a repayment in bankruptcy cL or CH , depending on the
realized state, the Recovery Rate (RR) for creditors is given by:
RR :=

cH − µ, with frequency
Pr.[Strategic Default]× p× b
1− p+ Pr.[Strategic Default]× p
sL, with frequency (1− b)
cL − µ, with frequency
(1− p)× b
1− p+ Pr.[Strategic Default]× p
The definition of recovery rates implicitly assumes that strategic default
18For instance, sL corresponds to the case of m = L absent verification; cH,L corresponds
to m = H when the true state is verified to be low, and so on.
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happens only in the high state, a property that is relatively obvious but will be
proved formally in our analysis, and not taken for granted. Both recovery rates
and credit spreads will depend on exogenous variables (that is, p, r, µ, L, H),
on contractual variables (that is, cH , cL and sL, sH) and on endogenous equi-
librium variables (that is, b and Pr.[Strategic Default]). The rest of the paper
is split in two conceptual parts. In the first, we derive the optimal contracts
as a function of the exogenous variables, and anticipating the nature of the
equilibrium response they will induce, in terms of both verification probabilities
and strategic default. Next, we study how credit spreads, recovery rates and
other statistics of interest vary as the exogenous parameters change. To start,
we characterize the full commitment benchmark.
2.4 Commitment benchmark
In this part, we present the full commitment benchmark, where C can commit
to take a defaulting B to court. We allow for the non-deterministic verification
probability as was mentioned before. The contribution of this part to the exist-
ing literature is a full characterisation of an optimal contract under the objective
of minimisation of expected verification probability. 19
If C can commit to verifying the state, the revelation principle holds and
we can restrict attention to direct truthful contracts. Two observations (which
we formally prove in the Appendix) help in simplifying the problem and the
notation: (i) it is never optimal to verify when the high state is reported by B,
so we know that bH = 0 and we can relabel bL ≡ b; (ii) because bH = 0, we have
one degree of freedom in setting cH,x. So, we set it equal to zero and relabel
cL,L ≡ cL and cL,H ≡ cH . It is well known that the optimal contract minimizes
the deadweight losses and at the optimal contract C receives an expected return
equal to r – a property we formally show in the Appendix. Therefore, optimal
19As a comparison, Border and Sobel (1987) consider revenue maximisation as an optimality
criterion and charachterise the set of efficient mechanisms. The difference with respect to
Mookherjee and Png (1989) is the fact that they consider a risk-averse principal.
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(IC) sH ≤ bcH + (1− b)sL
(PC) psH + (1− p)[b(cL − µ) + (1− b)sL] = r
(FCs) b ∈ [0, 1], 0 ≤ c ≤ x, 0 ≤ s ≤ x.
where IC stands for Incentive Constraint, PC for Participation Constraint and
FCs for Feasibility Constraints. The IC states that when B is in the high state,
he needs to be weakly better off by reporting it truthfully (and paying sH) than
by reporting a low state and pay either cH , if he is caught cheating, or sL is
there is no verification by C. The PC ensures that C gets an expected return
equal to r from her investment in the project, net of the expected bankruptcy
costs. The FCs guarantee that verification probabilities are interior, and that
all payments satisfy limited liability from both sides.
Notice that cL enters both PC and the deadweight loss function, because it
is transferred to C on-the-equilibrium path. In contrast, cH is off-equilibrium;
it serves as an incentive device to prevent strategic default by the high type
ex-post. Lemma 1 derives a few properties of optimal contracts that simplify
the analysis. First, it shows that verification must take place with positive
probability. If not, C can never attain an expected return equal to r (Claim 1,
a). Second, it shows that to compensate creditors for the default risk they are
taking, credit spreads must be strictly positive (Claim 1, b). Third, it states
that the incentive constraint must be binding (Claim 2) and that downside
protection has to be maximal (Claim 3).
Lemma 1. Optimal contracts under full commitment satisfy the following prop-
erties:
1. Investment takes place only if:
(a) Bankruptcy occurs on-the-equilibrium path (i.e., b > 0)
(b) Credit spreads are positive (i.e., CS > 0, or equivalently sH > r)
2. At any optimal contract, the incentive constraint must be binding
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3. Any optimal contract is equivalent to one with with maximal downside
protection (i.e., sL = L). Moreover, whenever b < 1 any contract with
sL 6= L is suboptimal
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 1 implies that the IC reads sH = bH + (1 − b)L. Plugging IC into
PC yields:
b(pH + (1− p)[c− µ]) + (1− b)L = r (2.1)
From equation (2.1), we obtain the necessary condition for investment pH+
(1 − p)[L − µ] ≥ r, which tells that contract when verification occurs with
probability one upon default, and C is a senior claimant upon verification, must
be feasible for investment to take place. Solving (2.1) for b yields:
b =
r − L
pH − L+ (1− p)[c− µ]
(2.2)
Nothing guarantees that there exists a feasible value for c such that the
fraction lies between zero and one, so we have to consider corner cases as well.
For now, assume such value exists. Substituting (2.2) into the objective function




pH − L+ (1− p)[c− µ]
s.t. 0 ≤ c ≤ L.
The sign of the first derivative is negative, which implies that we should set
c = L.
Observation 1. Investment takes place if and only if (1− p)µ+ r ≤ pH + (1−
p)L. The optimal contract sets cL = sL = L, cH = H, sH = bH + (1− b)L and
b = r−L
p(H−L)−(1−p)µ .
Proof. Trivial from the above argument. The investment condition comes from
b ≤ 1. Also, observe that b ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ p(H − L) − (1 − p)µ ≥ 0, which
always holds provided that (1 − p)µ + r ≤ pH + (1 − p)L, as required in the
Proposition.
A few lessons can be learned from Observation 1. First, the optimal secu-
rity resembles a fully collateralized standard debt contract. Differently from
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Townsend (1979), verification is generically interior.20 We do not find random
verification as an inherently non-realistic feature of allocations. In reality, de-
fault does not always trigger costly procedures such as monitoring, verification
or bankruptcy – depending on the interpretation, which is to some degree sub-
jective and specific to the application considered. What is not quite convincing
is that whenever C verifies, she is choosing an ex post suboptimal course of ac-
tion, because there is no residual uncertainty in equilibrium about the value of
B’s assets conditional on the report being L (i.e., default). Indeed, this property
makes the commitment allocation infeasible under limited commitment, as we
shall see.
The second lesson one can learn from Observation 1 is that asymmetric
information reduces the amount of projects that can be financed. In fact, when-
ever p(H − L) + L ∈ [r, r + (1 − p)µ) the borrower cannot raise funds from C
under incomplete information, while the project would still have positive net
present value under full information. The investment condition (1− p)µ + r ≤
pH + (1 − p)L may appear strange at first sight, because it states that invest-
ment takes place if and only if the expected proceeds from the project exceed
r plus the cost of verifying the low message with probability one under truth-
telling. However, we know that at the optimal contract generically we have
b < 1. To make sense of the condition, consider equation (2.1), which consists
of the participation constraint after a binding IC has been plugged in. Taking
the derivative with respect to b yields pH − L + (1 − p)(c − µ). Because it is
optimal to set c = L, the expression simplifies to p(H − L) − (1 − p)µ which
is always positive when the investment condition holds. In words, the expected
feasible repayment from B to C increases with b, so the highest payout occurs
when b = 1. If that is not enough for C to get r in expectation, then investment
cannot take place.
A final point worth stressing about 1 is that the verification probability –
and so the deadweight loss – increases in the risk-free rate r, as it governs the
minimum payout necessary to guarantee that C receives her required rate or
return.
20It reaches one only when the investment condition binds, which occurs for a measure zero
set of parameter values.
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2.5 Limited Commitment
Moving to limited commitment, we should consider the possibility that when B
is in state H, for instance, she reports with some probability that the state is L
instead.21 Denote the probability that a borrower in state i = L,H reports it
truthfully by (1 − di), for some di ∈ [0, 1]. It is straightforward to see that dL
will always be zero, so that we can restrict attention to dH only, and relabel it
d for ease of notation. According to the terminology used in the introduction, d
denotes the probability that B strategically defaults conditional on her being in
the high state. The unconditional probability of strategic default will be p× d.
Under truth-telling, the Verification Constraint (which we refer to as VC and
ensures that C’s strategy is ex post optimal) reads:
sL ≤ E[c|sL]− µ, with equality when b ∈ (0, 1). (V C)
The VC constraint ensures that C finds it weakly optimal to verify the state
of the world when a low message is reported by B. In this section, because of
truth-telling, the constraint simplifies and we have E[c|sL] = cL.
Lemma 2. Generically, the optimal contract under commitment does not satisfy
VC.
Proof. First, consider the generic case where the b of Observation 1 is strictly
less than one – equivalently, whenever the investment condition holds as a strict
inequality. In this case, simply note that while the contract requires b > 0, we
have sL = L > L− µ = c− µ, so C never wants to verify ex-post. In the (non-
generic) case where the investment condition holds with equality, one has the
freedom of setting sL as low as possible, subject to the feasibility requirement
that sL ≥ 0. As a consequence, setting sL = 0 we get that the allocation
implemented by the optimal contract of Observation 1 can be replicated under
limited commitment if and only if L ≥ µ, which may or may not hold.
2.5.1 Preventing strategic default under limited commitment
Lemma 2 shows that limited commitment concerns have pervasive effects: the
commitment solution is not implementable under limited commitment. It re-
21This is because the revelation principle can no longer be invoked.
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mains an open question whether optimal contracts adjust by allowing for strate-
gic default, or whether they prevent it with a different allocation of cash flow
rights. We break the analysis in two parts: first, we consider the optimal con-
tracts that prevent strategic default under limited commitment; then, we con-
sider the optimal contract under strategic default and compare the two. Lemma
3 allows us to simplify the analysis. The Lemma shows that at the optimal con-
tract that prevents strategic default, both the incentive constraint (Claim 1),
and the verification constraint (Claim 3) are binding. In addition, it shows
that investing under truth-telling is feasible only if µ ≤ L, as otherwise the
verification constraint cannot be satisfied by a feasible pair cL, sL.
Lemma 3. Optimal contracts that prevent strategic default under limited com-
mitment have the following properties:
1. At any optimal contract, the incentive constraint must be binding
2. For investment to be implementable, bankruptcy costs must be relatively
low: L ≥ µ.
3. Generically, when pH + (1 − p)(L − µ) > r, at any optimal contract VC
binds. Otherwise, in the non-generic case where pH + (1− p)(L− µ) = r,
there exists an optimal contract where VC binds.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In light of Lemma 3, and because we are implementing under truth-telling,





(IC) sH = bH + (1− b)sL
(V C) sL = c− µ
(PC) psH + (1− p)[b(c− µ) + (1− b)sL] = r
(FCs) b ∈ [0, 1], 0 ≤ c ≤ L, 0 ≤ si ≤ i, for i ∈ {L,H}.
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Plugging both IC and VC into PC yields:
b =
r − c+ µ
p(H − c+ µ)
The derivative with respect to c is negative, so we set c = L and Proposition 1
ensues.
Proposition 1. Investment takes place if and only if (1−p)µ+r ≤ pH+(1−p)L
and L ≥ µ. The optimal contract sets cL = L = sL + µ, cH = H, sH =
bH + (1− b)(L− µ) and b = r−L+µ
p(H−L+µ) .
Proof. Trivial from the above reasoning. Note that b > 0 for all parameter
values.
Although nothing guarantees that preventing strategically default is optimal
under limited commitment (as we shall prove, it is often suboptimal), it is worth
noticing a few properties of the optimal contracts that achieve this goal. At the
extensive margin, limited commitment reduces the set of creditors that can in-
vest without strategically defaulting. Indeed, all firms facing bankruptcy-related
costs larger than L won’t be able to invest without strategically defaulting on
their claims in the high state. At the intensive margin, instead, limited com-
mitment triggers an increase in the frequency with which default translates into
bankruptcy, which rises the associated deadweight losses. Absent strategic de-
fault, the probability of default in both cases is (1 − p), which implies that we
can simply consider whether we can rank the probability that default triggers
bankruptcy b across cases. The next Lemma shows that, as one would have
expected, they can be ranked.
Lemma 4. The optimal contract that prevents strategic default under limited
commitment features strictly higher probability that default triggers verification
(i.e., b) than the optimal contract under full commitment does.
Proof. Just for this proof, denote the optimal verification probability under
commitment (in Observation 1) by b1 and that under limited commitment and
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no strategic default (in Proposition 1) by b2. We have that:
b2 ≥ b1 ⇐⇒
r − L+ µ
p(H − L+ µ)
≥ r − L








>0 because r>L>0 and µ>0
×
(
p(H − L)− (1− p)µ)
p(H − L+ µ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 whenever the investment condition holds
> 0
In the next subsection we turn attention to the optimal contracts under
limited commitment, which may or may not involve strategic default.
2.5.2 Optimal contract under limited commitment
For notational convenience, define the posterior probability that the state is
high after the low message is observed by p(d) ≡ pd




b(1− p+ pd) (2.3)
subject to:
sH ≤ bcH + (1− b)sL, with equality whenever d ∈ (0, 1) (IC)




(1− d)sH + d
(








0 ≤ ci ≤ xi, b ∈ [0, 1], d ∈ [0, 1], and 0 ≤ si ≤ mi (FCs)
The Verification Constraint (i.e., VC) guarantees that C’s action is optimal ex
post, given the posterior she holds after having observed the message sent by B.
Notice that the objective function now reflects a change in perspective: op-
timal contracts do not minimize the probability of default per se, but rather
the probability that bankruptcy (i.e., verification) occurs. The direct effect of
strategic default on the deadweight losses is clearly positive – that is, strategic
default increases the deadweight losses by increasing the odds of B defaulting.
However, there is an indirect effect as well that links b to d, so that the overall
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impact of strategic default on the deadweight losses can go either way. We will
discuss when and why strategic default can decrease b, and how this indirect
effect could dominate the direct effect, after having derived a few preliminary
properties of optimal contracts.
Before proceeding, note that the necessary condition for investment in Ob-
servation 1, i.e. pH + (1 − p)L ≥ r + (1 − p)µ, remains necessary here. In
addition, Lemma 5 proves that both the incentive constraint (Claim 1) and the
verification constraint (Claim 3) must be binding. To show the latter, an inter-
mediate step is to prove that cH > sL (Claim 2). Finally, it shows that optimal
contract have full collateralization (Claim 4) and it provides another necessary
condition for investment to take place (Claim 5).
Lemma 5. Optimal contracts under limited commitment have the following
properties:
1. At any optimal contract, the incentive constraint must be binding
2. At any optimal contract, cH > sL
3. At any optimal contract where d > 0, V C must be binding
4. Any optimal contract features full collateralization: cH = H and cL = L
5. Investment is implementable only if p(H − L) + L ≥ µ
Proof. See the Appendix.
Plugging both IC and VC into PC and solving for b yields:
b(d) =
r − (p(d)H + (1− p(d))L− µ)
p(1− d)(H − (p(d)H + (1− p(d))L− µ))
As a result of the previous Claims, our problem becomes:
min
d
b(d)(1− p+ pd) (2.4)
subject to:
0 ≤ b(d) ≤ 1, d ∈ [0, 1], and 0 ≤ p(d)H + (1− p(d))L− µ ≤ L (FCs)
To tackle this problem, we take the following approach: first, we solve a
relaxed problem without feasibility constraints on the verification probability b;
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then we check if the solution we found for the relaxed problem is feasible. Even
without the feasibility constraints on b, we still have feasibility constraint on
sL. Potentially, they may be bind for some degree of strategic default d. What
helps us in the analysis is the strict monotonicity of such feasibility constraints
with respect to d. Indeed, because sL(d) = p(d)H + (1− p(d))L−µ is a strictly
increasing function of d, it follows that the feasibility constraints on sL(d) are






p(H − L− µ)
Proposition 2. A solution to the relaxed problem exists if and only if pH +
(1− p)L ≥ µ.
1. If L ≥ µ, there exist two cases:
(a) If p < p1 strategic default is prevented by optimal contracts: d = 0
and b = b0;
(b) If p ≥ p1 optimal contracts induce high strategic default: d = d̄ and
b = b(d̄);
2. If L < µ, then we must have d > 0 and there exist two cases:
(a) If p < p2 optimal contracts induce low strategic default: d = d and
b = b(d);
(b) If p ≥ p2optimal contracts induce high strategic default: d = d̄ and
b = b(d̄).









. We also have that p1 < p2.
Proof. In this proof, we concentrate on the case when (1−p)µ+r < pH+(1−p)L.
If the expression above holds as equality, then there exists only one feasible
contract: b = 1, d = 0 and sH = H. First, we investigate the behavior of our
objective function b(d)(1− p + pd). As it is shown in Appendix, the derivative
of this function potentially has two roots: d1 and d2. However, it turns out that
d2 does not belong to the [0, 1] range for any parameter configuration. Another
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property which is shown in the Appendix is that if µ+ r > pH + (1− p)L, then
limd→1−0 b(d)(1− p+ pd) = +∞. In this case, the derivative of the deadweight
loss function is always positive and its graph is strictly increasing in the [0, 1]
interval. In this case, one always chooses the left corner of the graph. As the
analysis in this parameter region is trivial, we pay more attention to the other,
more interesting case below. If µ+r < pH+(1−p)L, then limd→1−0 b(d)(1−p+
pd) = −∞. In this parameter region, as shown in the Appendix, it is possible to
have at most one local extremum point in (0, 1) interval. According to Lemma
2 in the Appendix, if d1 ∈ (0, 1) and if d1 is local extremum, then it must be
a local maximum. So, there are two cases to consider in the parameter region
where µ+r < pH+(1−p)L: the case where the local maximum d1 ∈ (0, 1), that
where there is no local maximum points in the (0, 1) region. In any event, we
shall compare the feasible left and right corners of the deadweight loss function
to determine, where the graph achieves its minimum point. The feasible left
corner of our graph will depend on the difference between L and µ. If L ≥ µ,
then left root coincides with point d = 0. Otherwise, the minimum feasible d is
determined by condition sL(d) = 0 and it equals: (1−p)(µ−L)p(H−µ) > 0. As for the right
corner, d = 1 is infeasible, because there is no finite non-negative verification
probability that would satisfy PC. So, the right corner is pinned down by the
condition sL(d) = L and it equals: 1 > (1−p)µp(H−L−µ) > 0 Feasibility of this root is
guaranteed by the parameter region we are considering: µ+ r < pH + (1− p)L.
A direct comparison of the feasible left corner and right corner in appropriate
parameter regions pins down values of p1 and p2.
After having derived a solution for the relaxed program, we now return to
the full problem, to check whether the verification probability associated with
our solution is indeed feasible.
Proposition 3. If the solution to the relaxed problem does not satisfy feasibility,
then there is no feasible contract that sustains investment.
Proof. The solution obtained in Proposition 2, subparts (1.a), (1.b) and (2.b) all
satisfy the constraint b(d∗) ≤ 1. So, feasibility holds in these regions. The
only case where the optimal contract found in Proposition 2 might not be
feasible is (2.a). In this parameter region, we are interested in the case of
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p < p2. The condition b(d) ≤ 1 is not satisfied by d if and only if: p < p̄ =
H(µ−L)+r(H−µ)
H(H−L) < p2. To prove that there is no feasible contract when p < p̄,
observe that equation b(d) = 1 has only one non-negative root and it is equal
to: d0 = pH+(1−p)L−(1−p)µ−rpµ . We can establish that d0 < d if p < p̄. So, if
d0 < d, then ∀d ≥ d : b(d) > 1. The last part comes from the fact if there was
d ∈ [d, 1) such that b(d) ≤ 1, then b(d) = 1 would have more than one root,
because we know that b(d) > 1. But this is impossible due to continuity of the
function b(d) over the [0, 1) interval.
Proposition 3 adds an additional necessary condition for investment, relative
the one stated in Proposition 2: p ≥ p̄. This condition is relevant only if L <
µ, otherwise it would be redundant, as summarized in the following Corollary
which gives necessary and sufficient conditions required for investment to be
sustainable under limited commitment.
Corollary 1. Investment under limited commitment takes place if and only if:
(i) pH + (1− p)L ≥ µ+ max{0, r − pµ}; and (ii) p ≥ p̄ while L ≤ µ.
The max operator takes into account that both the condition in Proposition
2 and that derived for the full commitment case (see Observation 1) need to hold,
and these cannot be ranked a priori because which one binds depends on the
relation between r and pµ, which is indeterminate given our assumptions. It is
useful to compare the conditions stated in Corollary 1 with those in Proposition
1, which were: (1− p)µ+ r ≤ pH + (1− p)L and L ≥ µ. Allowing for strategic
default relaxes the constraint L ≥ µ, allowing for investment to occur in this
case whenever p is sufficiently high. The intuition behind this result is as follows.
Strategic default increases the expected recovery rate, which is necessary for VC
to be satisfied. However, it also needs to have a beneficial (i.e., negative) effect
on b, because the marginal condition was coming from the constraint b ≤ 1.
This requires p to be sufficiently high.
While Corollary 1 and Proposition 2 – cases (2.a) and (2.b) – jointly clarify
the role played by strategic default at the extensive margin, we are also inter-
ested in its effect on investment terms, at the intensive margin. As stated in
Proposition 2, when p is small – as in case (1.a) – then strategic default does
not occur and optimal contracts implement truth-telling. For higher p we move
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to case (1.b), in which even if B could invest under truth-telling, she finds it
too expensive. This is because the negative effect of strategic default on the
probability that default triggers bankruptcy (i.e., b) more than compensates
the increase it brings about in the probability that B defaults. Namely, firms in
(1.b) feature a probability of default larger than p and, at the same time, a lower
probability that default triggers bankruptcy b. The combined effect lowers the
expected bankruptcy costs faced by these firms. To further analyze the effect
various parameters have on the likelihood and consequences of strategic default,
the next section derives several comparative statics of interest.
2.6 Comparative Statics
The main advantage of having analytical solutions and a relatively simple model
is that we are able to explicitly derive several comparative statics of interest.
Some will be more expected, others less so. Figure 2.1 plots the objective
function – that is, the expected deadweight losses from investment – across
three cases: (i) the full commitment case; (ii) the limited commitment case
under truth-telling; and (iii) the limited commitment case without the truth-
telling requirement. Few properties are worth noticing.
As it should be expected, the deadweight losses increase with bankruptcy
costs and are strictly lower under full commitment than they are under limited
commitment. Deadweight losses are lower because the creditors can commit that
they are going to take defaulting borrowers to court a certain amount of times,
even if this is (generically) ex post inefficient – by Lemma 2. As a consequence,
they can set both sL and cL as maximal, without worrying about the verification
constraint.
The deadweight losses are the lowest at the optimal contract that prevents
strategic default under full commitment. Again, this is expected, as we have
two additional constraints relative to the commitment case (i.e., d = 0 and
the verification constraint), and one additional constraint relative to the limited
commitment case (i.e., d = 0). In this case, investment takes place if and only
if µ ≤ 3, and when it does the deadweight losses are relatively large. Strategic
default helps in two regions. First at the intensive margin, when µ ≤ 2, in
which case one can compute that p ≥ p1 and we have strategic default d̄ > 0
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induced by the optimal contract. In this region, although feasible, preventing
strategic default is needlessly costly for the firm ex ante: a strictly positive
amount of strategic default lowers the expected deadweight losses. To see why
this happens, observe that the derivative of the deadweight loss function with









(1− p+ p× d)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Indirect Effect

While the direct effect of strategic default is always to increase the deadweight
losses, because for a given b the chances of observing the low message increase
with it, the indirect effect has an ambiguous sign. Namely, the probability of
verification may well fall with strategic default, and this is what our results
hinge on.
The second region in which strategic default helps is at the extensive margin,
where µ ∈ [3, 4]. In this case, investment would be impossible absent strate-
gic default, because of the verification constraint. This case is comparable, for
instance, to that studied in Bolton and Oehmke (2011) – absent credit deriva-
tives. A final observation related to Figure 2.1(a) is that the objective function
is continuous in µ, although not differentiable because of the multiple regimes-
switches occurring.
Another interesting angle is to study how the deadweight losses change as
the risk-free rate changes. From Figure 2.1(b), we observe that the value from
strategic default is concentrated in environments where the risk-free rate is low.
In such cases, implementing investment under truth-telling proves extremely
costly – the distance between the commitment and truthful deadweight losses
shrinks monotonically with r. As r increases, the slope of the deadweight loss
function under commitment is flatter than that of the optimal contract undr
limited commitment, which quickly converges towards that of truth-telling and
merges with it for µ ≥ 4.
Now, we can turn attention to the credit spreads. Figure 2.1(c) shows that
spreads are uniformly lower under commitment and higher under limited com-
mitment and truth-telling. At the intensive margin, strategic default strictly
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Figure 2-1: Losses, Credit Spreads and the Economy
(a) Losses and Bankruptcy Costs








(b) Losses and Risk-free Rates






(c) Credit Spreads and Bankruptcy Costs






(d) Credit Spreads and Risk-free Rate







Green: full commitment case; Orange: limited commitment and truth-telling; Blue: limited
commitment. Parameter values: p = 0.5, µ = 2, L = 3, H = 10.
lowers the credit spreads whenever µ ≤ 2, and they jump up at µ = 2 when the
regime switches from implementing d̄ to implementing d = 0. Although they
are continuous for µ ≥ 2 – provided that investment is implementable – credit
spreads are not a differentiable function of µ in this range either, because of
another regime swith from d = 0 to d = d which occurs at µ = 3.
As shown in Figure 2.1(d), and consistent with the empirical evidence, credit
spreads increase with the risk-free rate r, which proxies for the required rate of
return of competitive investors to finance the project. Under limited commit-
ment, credit spreads discontinuously jump up at a critical level of r – in our
numerical example, at r = 4.
Figure 2.2(a) plots the frequency of strategic default as a function of the
bankruptcy cost µ, clarifying the reasons behind the observed jump in credit
spreads. The non-monotonicity of strategic default in the costs of bankruptcy
is, to our knowledge, a new result of this paper relative to the existing literature,
although it need not hold for all parameter values.
Turning to the model’s implications for recovery rates, 2.2(b) plots the out-
of-court recovery rate as a function of the bankruptcy costs µ. Strategic default
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Figure 2-2: Some Economic Effects of Bankruptcy costs
(a) Strategic Default







(b) Recovery Rates Out-of-Court









Orange: limited commitment and truth-telling; Blue: limited commitment.
Parameter values: p = 0.5, r = 4, L = 3, H = 10.
for low values of µ generates higher recovery rates than truthful reporting. In
particular, the equilibrium amount of strategic default is such that recovery rates
are flat in µ, until we switch regime and, for bankruptcy costs µ ≥ 3, recovery
rates out-of-court drop discretely and then keep falling continuously throughout.
This is consistent with the empirical evidence in Djankov et al. (2008), but it
highlights an important, yet often overlooked, point. Because when bankruptcy
costs increase recovery rates out-of-court decrease, consistently with the story
that creditors have lower bargaining power vis à vis their debtors, it is not obvi-
ous that higher bankruptcy costs should be associated with more restructuring
out-of-court (as suggested in Jensen (1991)). We now turn attention to this
empirical prediction and study if it is consistent with our model.
To this end, Figure 2.4 plots the frequencies of each possible default event
as a function of the costs of bankruptcy µ. Recall that, upon default, three
events might occur in the model: (i) default is resolved out-of-court, by means
of a private restructuring of claims; (ii) default triggers bankruptcy and the firm
is insolvent; (iii) default triggers bankruptcy but the firm is solvent – i.e., the
default event was strategic. As the Figure 2.3 shows, the frequency of an out-
of-court restructuring falls as bankruptcy costs increase.22 This is because high
bankruptcy costs imply lower value of equilibrium out-of-court restructuring
plans, which in turns induces high incentives to strategic default and needs to
be countered, for investment to take place, by a higher probability that default
22Corollary 2 will formally show this fact.
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is resolved in-court. This prediction is consistent with the fact that private
restructuring of debt is particularly relevant in countries where bankruptcy costs
are not prohibitively high, such as the US. However, it still needs to be tested
in the data – to our knowledge.
As for the recovery rates in bankruptcy, it is non-monotonic: it is high when
bankruptcy costs are low, because of strategic default at the intensive margin;
it falls in intermediate ranges of µ, because now truthful reporting becomes
optimal; finally, it increases at the extensive margin when bankruptcy costs are
high, and absent strategic default the parties would not be able to invest. In
general, upon bankruptcy the recovery rates distribution is predicted to be bi-
modal, with a peak on the low and a peak on the high recovery state. With more
than two states, predictions do not change, but the distribution will become
increasingly spread out, as it typically is in the data.
In Proposition 2 we derived threshold for the solvency probability p – we
labelled them p1 and p2 – such that strategic default increases above the thresh-
olds. However, it remains to be studied the local changes in strategic default
as the main parameters of interest increase. The next Lemma answers such
question.23
Lemma 6. Locally, the optimal level of strategic default behaves as follows:



























23We omit the proof because it simply consists in taking a few first derivatives.
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Parameter values: p = 0.5, r = 4, L = 3, H = 10.
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Parameter values: p = 0.5, µ = 2, L = 3, H = 10.
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• It does not vary with the risk-less rate r.
A few lessons can be learned from Lemma 6. First, consider the effect
of µ, which acts as our modeling proxy for bankruptcy-related costs, and can
be taken as a measure of the degree of creditors’ protection provided by the
institutional environment in which investment takes place. Locally, an increase
in µ brings about an increase of strategic default instances. This is because a
higher µ means a weaker bargaining position for the creditors ex post, which
itself translates into lower incentive compatible returns on the securities they
hold absent verification. For the creditors to break even, borrowers must default
more frequently in equilibrium. However, as bankruptcy costs increase there is
a regime shift at the thresholds p1 and p2, at which the frequency of strategic
default falls. As a consequence, the effect is overall non-monotonic.
In addition, we have a formal statement about the local behaviour of the
probability that bankruptcy will take place after default. It immediately follows
from the first part of Lemma 6 .
Corollary 2. Locally, the level of bankruptcy probability is increasing with the
bankruptcy costs : δb
δµ
> 0
Second, consider the effect of p on strategic default, which is shown in Figure
2.5. When the solvency probability p is sufficiently small, then there is either
no investment (if L ≤ µ), or investment takes place without inducing incentives
for the borrower to strategically default. As p rises, we hit the threshold p ≥ p̄,
above which strategic default enables investment to take place. Above p̄, further
local increases in solvency probabilities lower the frequency of strategic default
in equilibrium monotonically, until we hit the threshold at which we shift from
d to d̄. The probability of borrowers strategically defaulting jumps up, for then
falling monotonically again. As a result, overall the effect of p on d is also
non-monotonic.
Finally, although it appears surprising that r does not locally affect strategic
default, it should be noted that it affects the thresholds p1 and p2, so determining
at which parameter configuration the regime shift occurs. In particular, the
effect of r on the thresholds is positive.
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Figure 2-5: Strategic Default and Solvency Probability









Parameter values: µ = 2, L = 0.8, r = 3, H = 9
2.7 No Commitment
In this section, we analyze the case where creditors cannot contract on any
mapping that includes reported states, in the spirit of Gale and Hellwig (1989).
In the previous analysis, creditors could not contract on verification b, but they
still could contract on payments absent verification si for i ∈ {L,H}. It remains
to be understood what happens when also the function si cannot be contracted
upon. As usual, we begin by establishing some useful properties of optimal
contracts for this case. Notice that a contract still exists, in that it can specify
a function cx : {L,H} → R+. Also, we cannot a priori rule out that the both ex
post types – i.e., x = L and x = H – use mixed strategies, so we need to return
to our indexed notation di and bi, where i ∈ {L,H}.
When si is not contractible, the ex post game changes. Now, first the bor-
rower offers a repayment si. We will start our analysis with three levels of
repayments i ∈ {L,M,H} and we show in the Appendix that for any number
of repayments i ∈ {s1, s2, ..., sn}, it is without loss of generality to concentrate
on two levels of repayment i ∈ {L,H}.
Upon observing si, the creditor updates her belief about the realized return,
and chooses whether or not to verify the state and be able to enforce payments
cx accordingly. Importantly, there are infinite possible off-equilibrium payments.
If the creditor observes payment other than si for i ∈ {L,M,H}, Bayes’ rule
cannot be used to update the beliefs and therefore the posterior is arbitrary.
In the absence of a better criterion, we will characterize equilibria and optimal
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contract for the case where, out of equilibrium, creditors believe that the offer
comes from the high type with probability one. Of course, this choice is with
loss of generality, but so would any other choice be. See Gale and Hellwig (1989)
for a discussion of the problem, and of the potential refinements. The general
problem we consider in this section reads as follows:
min
cL,cH
bL(1− dL)(1− p) + bM(pdH + (1− p)dL)
subject to:




≤ bMcH + (1− bM)sM if dH = 0
= bMcH + (1− bM)sM if dH ∈ (0, 1)
≥ bMcH + (1− bM)sM if dH = 1
(ICH,1)
sH ≤ bLcH + (1− bL)sL (ICH,2)
sM ≤ p(d)cH + (1− p(d))cL − µ, with equality if bM ∈ (0, 1) (V C0)
sL ≤ cL − µ, with equality if bL ∈ (0, 1) (V C1)
sH ≥ cH − µ, (V C2)
p[(1− dH)sH + dH(bM(cH − µ) + (1− bM)sM)] + (1− p)×
× [(1− dL)(bL(cL − µ) + (1− bL)sL) + dL(bM(cL − µ) + (1− bM)sM)] = r,
(PC)
0 ≤ cL ≤ L, and 0 ≤ cH ≤ H, (FCs)
where the posterior belief p(d) reads:
p(d) =
pdH
(1− p)dL + pdH
About the program, three comments are due. First, the only contractual vari-
ables are cL and cH , as everything else will be induced as part of a bayesian
equilibrium played ex post. Second, the objective function now comprises of
both verification upon the low offered repayment, and verification upon the in-
termediate offered repayment. Strategic default might arise only in the latter
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case (see Lemma 7: Claim 8 in the Appendix for a formal discussion). Finally,
the problem has several additional constraints. Let us review them one by one,
and explain their origin and meaning before proceeding to the analysis.
Among the constraints to the problem, ICL guarantees that when the firm
is in the low state it does not find it strictly beneficial to claim it is in the
middle state. ICH,1 and ICH,2 guarantee that when the firm is in the high
state it finds it weakly beneficial to report according to a specific dH . Then,
there are three ‘verification constraints’: V C0 ensures that there is verification
upon medium reported returns, given the posterior belief that the state is high
p(d). This constraint was also present before. V C1 and V C2 ensure that the
creditor finds it weakly optimal to verify in the low and in the high state. While
V C1 is intuitive, and it just reflects the fact that the low report only comes
in equilibrium from the low type, V C2 needs further clarification. Notice that
now nothing prevents the creditor from verifying also upon observing the high
report. This is because reported states are not contractible (they are not even
observable to third parties). As a consequence, the high payment needs to be
such that the creditor does find it weakly optimal not to verify in this case –
hence, the inequality is flipped. To conclude the problem, we have our usual
Participation Constraint PC and the feasibility constraints on cL and cH (i.e.,
the FCs). As done in the previous sections, we proceed by proving a set of
preliminary claims that simplify the problem.
Lemma 7. Optimal contracts that prevent strategic default under non con-
tractible communication have the following properties:
1. Without loss, we can restrict attention to contract such that V C1 binds
2. At any optimal contract V C2 binds
3. For investment to take place, it must be that cH − µ > L
4. If bM = 1, then we must have a separating equilibrium where sM = sL =
cL − µ
5. Without loss, we can restrict attention to contract such that V C0 binds
6. Without loss, we can restrict attention to contract such that ICL binds
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7. At any optimal contract bL ≥ bM , with strict inequality when sL 6= sM
8. If ICH,1 holds with equality, than ICH,2 always holds strictly
9. At any optimal contract sH ≤ bMcH + (1− bM)sM
10. At any optimal contract ICH,1 binds
Proof. See the Appendix.
The Lemma presents the result in the ‘right’ sequence, in the sense that to
prove claim (2), we use claim (1), and so on. It states that all the V Cs and the
ICs are binding, and that the verification probability monotonically falls with
the reported states. Now we are equipped to characterize the solution to our
problem.
Lemma 8. Any equilibrium where there are three repayment levels {sL, sM , sH}
is dominated by another equilibrium with two repayment levels {sL, sH}.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The proof to Lemma 8 is technical, and we defer its discussion to the Ap-
pendix. However, it allows us to greatly simplify the problem and to derive a





sH = bcH + (1− b)sL, with equality if d ∈ [0, 1] (IC)
sL = p(d)cH + (1− p(d))cL − µ, with equality if bM ∈ [0, 1] (V C)
p[(1− d)sH + d(b(cH − µ) + (1− b)sL)] + (1− p)[(b(cL − µ) + (1− b)sL)] = r
(PC)
0 ≤ cL, sL ≤ L, and 0 ≤ cH , sH ≤ H (FCs)
Notice that we can dispense any reference to the medium repayment, and we
return to a familiar V C that works for the low repayment and ensures that ver-
ification does sometimes happen there. The following Proposition characterizes
optimal contracts and the allocations they implement.
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Proposition 4. The solution of above problem exists iff pH + (1− p)L ≥ µ+ r
1. If L ≥ µ:
d = 0, b = r−L+µ
(r−L+µ)+pµ , cL = L, cH = L+
b
1−bµ, sL = L− µ
2. If L < µ, then we must have d > 0 and there exist two cases:
(a) If p < pH−r
µ
then d = µ(1−p)
r+(1−p)µ , b =
r
r+µp(1−d) , cL = 0, cH =
r+µp(1−d)
(1−d)p , sL =
0.
(b) If p ≥ pH−r
µ
, then d = pH−r
pH
, b = H−r−µ
H−r−µp(1−d) , cL =
r+µ−pH
(1−p) , cH =
H, sL = 0.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Importantly, in Proposition 4 the only contractual variables are the repay-
ments upon bankruptcy cL and cH . Those are taken as given in the closest paper
that studies a similar model, that is Gale and Hellwig (1989). However, such
restriction is not without loss of generality, as in this case these variables change
dramatically across parameters. While in case (1) debt is secured, as it had been
in the previous limited commitment case, in part (2) debt is unsecured, and it
only pays off in the high state if strategic default occurs. In addition, cH is no
longer equal to H in parts (1) and (2,a) – i.e., the maximum value consistent
with limited liability. In these cases, cH is always interior now, and it governs
credit spreads. To establish this link is another novel contribution of our work.
The deadweight losses and credit spreads increase with bankruptcy costs
and with the risk-free rate, as before. Credit spreads are also higher, reflecting
further constraints to the economic allocation of resources. Figures 2.6(a) -
2.6(d) revisit our previous plots by adding the no commitment case. As shown
in the figures, lack of commitment to transfers severely affects the extensive
margin, as now the underinvestment problem kicks in at a much lower threshold
of bankruptcy costs.
A final remark: a reader might be disturbed by the apparent lack of mul-
tiple equilibria. This is solely a function of our arbitrary assumption that off-
equilibrium beliefs are that any deviation comes from the high type. This is a
simplification, and leaves aside many interesting issues that Gale and Hellwig
(1989) discuss and explore at length. However, it has a natural motivation in
42
Figure 2-6: Losses, Credit Spreads and the Economy (revisited)
(a) Losses and Bankruptcy Costs








(b) Losses and Risk-free Rates






(c) Credit Spreads and Bankruptcy Costs






(d) Credit Spreads and Risk-free Rate







Green: full commitment case; Orange: limited commitment and truth-telling; Blue: limited
commitment; Red: no commitment. Parameter values: p = 0.5, µ = 2, L = 3, H = 10.
our setting: any different off-equilibrium belief would further constrain the eco-
nomic allocation, inducing weakly larger deadweight losses and credit spread.
We just focus on the lower bound, and shows how it compares to the other cases.
2.8 Beyond two states
In the final extension to our model, we finally move beyond two states (default;
no default), by introducing a third ‘medium’ state between the low and the
high previously considered. The goal of this extension is twofold. First, we will
show that our qualitative results do not depend on the cardinality of the state
space, which would not surprise readers familiar with costly-state-verification
models. Second, we will clarify why we restricted attention to the two-state
case, instead of writing a more general model from the start. The three-state
case proves very hard to analyze, and the numerical simulations will shed some
light on the reasons behind such complications.
Figure 2.7(a) plots the deadweight losses for the commitment and the limited
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Figure 2-7: Losses, Credit Spreads and the Economy (revisited)
(a) Losses and Bankruptcy Costs








(b) Losses and Risk-free Rates






Orange: strategic default in the high state dH ; Blue: strategic default in the medium state
dM . Parameter values: pH = 0.5, pM = 0.2, r = 2, L = 1, M = 3, H = 6.
commitment cases across values of µ. The displayed dots are the results of a
numerical simulation. Once again, the deadweight losses are increasing in µ.
Limited commitment reduces the efficiency of the implemented allocations in a
similar fashion as it did in the two-state case.
Importantly, Figure 2.7(b) shows that strategic default need not be a mono-
tonic function of the realized returns: the chances that strategic default hap-
pens from firms in the high state are larger than the chances it happens in the
medium state (which, although very low, are never zero in our simulations).
Further, although it cannot be seen in the figure, strategic default might remain
a non-monotonic function of µ: it is not monotonic in the medium state. These
results clarifies some of the technical difficulties involved in analytically solving
our model with more than two states.
2.9 Conclusions
We considered a costly-state-verification model where (i) creditors can random-
ize their verification strategies, but (ii) they cannot commit to a mapping from
reported states to verification policies in the contract. We find both assumptions
realistic. As for randomization, in practice we observe that out-of-court restruc-
turing plans are only sometimes successful in avoiding costly bankruptcy. As for
limited commitment, there are limited ways to commit to a certain restructuring
protocol at the investment stage.
These two assumptions jointly generate incentives for borrowers to strategi-
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cally default on their debts at the optimal contract. Strategic default increases
the bargaining power creditors have ex post, at the restructuring stage, by rising
the expected recovery rate from bankruptcy. As a consequence, it serves two
purposes. At the extensive margin, it enables firms operating in countries with
weak creditors’ protection and high bankruptcy costs to invest. At the intensive
margin, it enables firms to save on expected bankruptcy costs by reducing the
probability that default triggers costly bankruptcy.
To sum up, bankruptcy-related costs and limited commitment on the credi-
tors’ side jointly imply that: (i) borrowers may find it optimal to default strate-
gically on their debts; (ii) strategic default is necessary for investment to take
place in environments characterized by high bankruptcy costs; (iii) even when
strategic default could be avoided by choosing some feasible capital structures,
firms and investors may prefer alternatives that induce strategic default with
positive probability in an effort to reduce the deadweight losses associated with
bankruptcy and maximize firm value; (iv) when strategic default is associated
to higher firm value, we should observe both a higher default frequency and
a higher probability of successful restructuring of out-of-court; (v) therefore, a
higher probability of default does not necessarily imply a lower firm value.
We wish that these findings might inform future empirical end theoretical
work on the costs and benefits of strategic default in financial markets, and to
enrich credit risk models with an endogenous fraction of default events that are
predicted to resolve out-of-court.
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2.10 Appendix
2.10.1 Full problem in the commitment case
We consider the problem an optimal contract solves when the creditor can com-
mit to a verification strategy contractually. As was mentioned in Section 3, the
repayment upon verification is a function of both the message and the state.
The verification probability b(mi) is a function of the message. In addition, we
have two incentive constraints: one for the low state and the second for the high
state. The full problem reads:
max
b(mi),c(mi,j),s(mi)
p(b(mH)(H − cH,H) + (1− b(mH))(H − sH))+
(1− p)(b(mL)(L− cL,L) + (1− b(mL))(L− sL))
subject to:
b(mL)cL,L + (1− b(mL))sL ≤ b(mH)cH,L + (1− b(mH))sH
(ICL)
b(mH)cH,H + (1− b(mH))sH ≤ b(mL)cL,H + (1− b(mL))sL
(ICH)
p(b(mH)(cH,H − µ) + (1− b(mH))sH)+
+ (1− p)(b(mL)(cL,L − µ) + (1− b(mL))sL) ≥ r (PC)
b(mi) ∈ [0, 1], 0 ≤ cmi,j ≤ xi, 0 ≤ si ≤ xi for i, j ∈ {L,H}
(FC)
The first thing to notice is the fact that at an optimal contract PC must
hold as an equality. Suppose not, then there exists another contract which
gives higher profit to the borrower. Take all repayments c(mi, j), s(mi) and
scale it down by the fraction φ ∈ (0, 1): such that c(mi, j)′ = φc(mi, j) and
s(mi)
′ = φs(mi). The fraction φ is chosen in such a way that PC holds as
equality at the new contract:
φ =
r
p(b(mH)(cH,H − µ) + (1− b(mH))sH) + (1− p)(b(mL)(cL,L − µ) + (1− b(mL))sL)
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This deviation is feasible, because it satisfies IC, and PC now holds as an
equality. Also it decreases the total transfer from the borrower to the creditor.
So, the utility of the borrower will be higher at the new contract, proving that
PC binds.
Second, since PC binds at the optimal contract , we can rewrite our objec-
tive function by plugging PC to the original objective function. The resulting
expression reads:
UB = pH + (1− p)L− r − (pb(mH) + (1− p)b(mL))µ
The first three terms are constants and denote the expected net profit that can
be obtained from the project. They do not affect the solution, so our problem
can be re-written as follows:
min
b(mi),c(mi,j),s(mi)
(pb(mH) + (1− p)b(mL))µ s.t.
(ICL), (ICH), (PC), (FCs)
This formulation stresses the fact that the maximization of the borrower’s util-
ity is equivalent to minimization of the deadweight losses associated with the
verification.
The third observation we make is that b(mH)cH,H + (1 − b(mH))sH > r.
Otherwise, it is easy to check that a contract which does not satisfy this condition
is infeasible, because it would violate PC.
The forth observation is that b(mH) = 0. This can be proved by contradic-
tion. Imagine that in the optimal contract b(mH) > 0, then we could propose
a new contract that yields higher utility to the borrower. Set b(mH)′ = 0,
s′H = b(mH)cH,H + (1 − b(mH))sH . It is possible to set such a level of s′H , be-
cause r < b(mH)cH,H + (1 − b(mH))sH ≤ H. ICH and PC are unchanged at
the new contract, so the only constraint to check is ICL. The constraint reads:
b(mL)cL,L + (1− b(mL))sL < s′H
The inequality follows from the fact that the RHS of the expression above is
strictly less than r, so the borrower has strict incentives to tell the truth in
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the low state. So, the new contract satisfies ICL as well. This concludes the
proof that b(mH) = 0. Because b(mH) = 0 makes the choice of cH,H and cH,L
irrelevant, we can simplify the notation and relabel cL,H = cH and cL,L = cL.
The fifth observation is the fact that at the optimal contract ICL is slack.
This follows from the fact that at any optimal contract b(mH) = 0. If ICL is
satisfied with equality, then it means that sH ≤ L, which contradicts feasibility.
So, if we consider the set of contract where b(mH) = 0, then we can omit ICL.
The sixth observation is the following one: the punishment for the strategic
defaulter must be cH = H.
Proof. We consider two cases: b < 1 and b = 1. When b < 1, if we assume that in
the optimal contract cH < H, there always exists a feasible contract c′H = cH+ε,
b′ = b− δ and s′H = b′c′H + (1− b′)L where δ > 0 and ε =
δ(pcH+(1−p)(cL−µ))
p(b−δ) > 0.
The positive sign of the ε follows from the same arguments as in Claim 3 of
Lemma 1. So, we have feasible contract with a lower verification probability,
reaching a contradiction.
For the case when b = 1, we observe that b = 1 is optimal if and only if
pH + (1 − p)(L − µ) = r. If instead pH + (1 − p)(L − µ) > r, then there
exists a contract with b < 1. This follows from the fact that if b = 1 and
ci = xi, then the borrower compensates the creditor strictly more than r. The
borrower can slightly decrease b still satisfying PC. In the other direction, if
pH + (1− p)(L− µ) = r then b = 1 and ci = xi is the only feasible contract, so
it should be optimal. As a result, whenever at the optimal contract b = 1, then
it follows necessarily that cH = H.
This leads to the reduced formulation of the problem, which we consider in
the main text.
2.10.2 Proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. Claim 1: Start with part (a), and suppose by contradiction that b = 0.
IC reads sH ≤ sL. But, by feasibility constraints, sL ≤ L, so PC cannot be
satisfied because L < r. As for part (b), suppose by contradiction that sH ≤ r.
Then, PC reads psH + (1 − p)[b(cL − µ) + (1 − b)sL] = r. But, by feasibility,
cL ≤ L and sL ≤ L, so PC is not satisfied.
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Claim 2: Suppose by contradiction that IC is slack: sH < bH + (1− b)sL.
PC reads psH + (1−p)[b(cL−µ) + (1− b)L)] = r. There exists another contract
s′H = sH + ε and b′ = b − δ, where ε =
(1−p)δ((cL−µ)−sL)
p
and δ > 0. For δ small
enough, the new contract satisfies IC, while PC holds by the construction of ε
as a function of δ. As a result, we obtain a new contract with b′ < b. This
reduction in b is feasible due to Claim 1. So, the deadweight losses decrease and
we reach a contradiction.
Claim 3: First, we will consider the case when b < 1. Plugging IC into PC
yields: b(pcH + (1 − p)(cL − µ)) + (1 − b)sL = r. This expression determines
the set of feasible contracts. Suppose that at the optimal contract sL < L, then
we can propose a new contract s′L = sL − ε and b′ = b − δ, where δ > 0 and
ε = (pcH+(1−p)(cL−µ))δ
1−(b−δ) > 0. The condition that guarantees that ε > 0 is given by:
pcH + (1 − p)(cL − µ) > r (as required by feasibility). The repayment in the
high state is s′H = b′cH +(1−b′)s′L. The new contract achieves lower verification
probability, reducing the deadweight losses. So, sL cannot be less than L.
If b = 1, we have sH = H and pcH + (1 − p)(cL − µ) = r. As sL is off-
equilibrium, we can set it equal to L without loss of generality.
2.10.3 Proof of Lemma 3.
Proof. Claim 1: The proof is identical to the one for the commitment case (see
Lemma 1).
Claim 2: If the inequality does not hold, there will not exist a feasible cL
that gives a weakly positive payoff to the creditor upon verification, and, because
sL ≥ 0, the VC cannot be satisfied by any feasible pair (sL, cL).
Claim 3: We know that b > 0 is needed for the investment to take place,
so VC reads sL ≤ c − µ, with equality whenever b ∈ (0, 1). We are left with
one case: b = 1 and sL < c − µ. We know from the Proposition 1 that b = 1
is optimal if and only if pH + (1 − p)(L − µ) = r. This contract is feasible
also in the case of limited commitment, because we know that L ≥ µ. Now, we
consider the case when pH+(1−p)(L−µ) > r, b = 1 and VC reads sL < cL−µ.
First, from PC either cH < H or cL < L. Suppose that cL < L and consider a
deviation to the new contract where b = 1− ε, c′L = cL + δ, s′L = cL + δ−µ and
s′H = (1− ε)cH + εs′L. For every ε > 0 there exists δ =
εp(cH−s′L)
(1−p) > 0, such that
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PC holds. The last inequality comes from the fact that at any feasible contract
cH > r. From the definitions of s′H and s′L, both IC and VC hold, and VC holds
with equality. So, we found a new contract where b is lower and VC binds. The
same reasoning holds if cH < H: b′ = 1− ε, c′H = cH + ε(cH − cL + µ), s′H = sH
and s′L = cL − µ.
2.10.4 Proof of Lemma 5.
Proof. Claim 1: We proceed by contradiction. If IC does not bind, then we
must have d = 0. We have to consider two cases, depending on whether or not
VC binds. First, suppose it binds. The contract has to satisfy the following set
of constraints:
sH < bcH + (1− b)sL, (IC)
sL = cL − µ, (VC)
psH + (1− p)
[
b(cL − µ) + (1− b)sL
]
= r (PC)
Consider now the following deviation: s′H = sH , s′L = sL, c′L = cL, c′H = cH ,
b′ = b − δ. By the Archimedian property of real numbers and the fact that
in the original contract b > 0, ∃δ > 0 such that IC is satisfied (strictly) for
some b′ > 0. Both V C and PC are unchanged. So, the new contract lowers the
deadweight losses, leading to contradiction.
As for the second case, suppose that V C is not binding. Now, we have b = 1
and the contract has to satisfy:
sH < cH , (IC)
sL < cL − µ, (VC)





Consider now the following deviation: s′H = sH − ε, s′L = sL, c′L = cL, c′H = cH ,
b′ = 1 − δ , where ε = δ(1−p)(cL−µ−sL)
p
> 0. By the Archimedian property and
the fact that in original contract b > 0 and sH < H, ∃δ > 0 at which the new
contract satisfies PC, V C and IC. As in the previous case, the new contract
lowers the deadweight losses, reaching a contradiction. So, we conclude that at
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any optimal contract IC must be binding.
Claim 2: By contradiction, consider a contract where cH ≤ sL and IC binds.
From IC we know that sH = bcH + (1− b)sL. It follows that sH ∈ [0, sL]. The









b(cL−µ) + (1− b)sL
]
= r. The LHS of this equation is at most equal to
L, whereas the RHS is equal to r > L. So, there does not exist b ∈ [0, 1], such
that PC holds. We conclude that there does not exist a feasible contract where
cH ≤ sL.
Claim 3: Suppose by contradiction that V C is slack. By Claim 1, we know
that IC binds. Moreover, we restrict attention to d > 0 because the case of
d = 0 was considered in the previous section. If V C is slack, then we must have
that b = 1 and any feasible contract must satisfy the following set of constraints:
sH = cH , (IC)
sL < p(d)cH + (1− p(d))cL − µ, (VC)
p
[









Consider now the following deviation: s′H = sH − δ, s′L = sL, c′L = cL, c′H =
cH − δ, b′ = 1, d′ = d − ε, where δ = µε. By the Archimedian property of real
numbers and the fact that in the original contract cH > L, ∃ε > 0 such that V C
holds as strict inequality, PC is unchanged because of the way δ was defined,
and IC also holds. As at the original contract d > 0, such a deviation is feasible
and it reduces the deadweight losses, reaching a contradiction and proving that
VC binds.
Claim 4: From the previous analysis, we established that at the optimal
contract IC and V C both bind. Moreover, because the case of d = 0 was
covered in the previous section, we restrict attention to d > 0 here. Once again,
we prove the claim by contradiction. Suppose that cL < L. VC reads: sL =
p(d)cH + (1− p(d))cL−µ and combining PC with IC we get: b = r−sLp(1−d)(cH−sL) .
Consider now the following deviation: s′H = b′cH+(1−b′)sL, s′L = sL, c′L = cL+ε,
c′H = cH , b′ =
r−sL
p(1−d′)(cH−sL)
, d′ = d − δ, where δ = ε(1−p)
p(cH−sL−µ)
. From the
Archimedian property of real numbers and Claim 1, ∃ε > 0 such that δ > 0,
IC is satisfied, V C is unchanged because of our definition of δ, and PC holds
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because b′ < b. As we just found a feasible contract where b′ < b and d′ < d,
the deadweight losses must be lower than at the original contract we started,
reaching a contradiction.
As for the case of cH < H, the logic is very similar. The deviation from
d consists in subtracting δ = ε
(cH−sL−µ+ε)
, which is positive number given that






The objective function at the new contract is strictly less than the contract we
started from, reaching a contradiction.
Claim 5: To derive the necessity of this condition, one should look at VC:
sL ≤ p(d)cH + (1 − p(d))cL − µ, with equality whenever b ∈ (0, 1). The RHS
reaches a maximum at the point cH = H, cL = L, d = 1 and it is equal to:
p(H − L) + L − µ. If this expression is strictly less than zero, then no feasible
contract can induce the investments in the project.
2.10.5 Additional details of Proposition 2
The objective function is a continuous function everywhere where it is defined:
DWL(d) =
r − (p(d)H + (1− p(d))L− µ)
p(1− d)(H − (p(d)H + (1− p(d))L− µ))
(1− p+ pd)
As can be seen from the denominator of the expression above, the graph is
unbounded at two points: d = 1 and d = pH+(1−p)L−(1−p)µ−H
pµ
< 0. There is only
one non-negative point where the graph can reach zero:
d0 =
pH + (1− p)L− (1− p)µ− r
pµ
We are interested in how the graph behaves when we approach to 1 from the
left. As there is only one non-negative root of the DWL function and we know
that d = 1 is the only non-negative vertical asymptote, it follows that if the root
d0 > 1, then limd→1−0 b(d)(1− p+ pd) = +∞. If d0 < 1, then limd→1−0 b(d)(1−
p + pd) = −∞. Finally, if d0 = 1, then limd→1−0 b(d)(1 − p + pd) = 0, because
the quadratic term in the numerator vanishes faster than the linear term in
denominator.




(µ+ (−1 + d)µp)2 + µ(1 + (−1 + d)p)(r + (−1 + d)pr − (−1 + p+ dp)H + 2(−1 + p)L)+
+ (−1 + p)(H − L)((−1 + (−1 + d)2p2)r + L− p((−1 + (−1 + d)2p)H + L))
(1− d)2p(µ+ (−1 + d)µp− (−1 + p)(H − L))2
The numerator of the expression is a quadratic function of d, which can have
two roots:
d1 =
((−1 + p)p(µ2 + µ(r − L) + p(r −H)(H − L))−
√
(−1 + p)2p2(r −H)(H − L)2(µ+ r − pH + (−1 + p)L)
(p2(µ2 + µ(r −H) + (−1 + p)(r −H)(H − L)))
d2 =
((−1 + p)p(µ2 + µ(r − L) + p(r −H)(H − L)) +
√
(−1 + p)2p2(r −H)(H − L)2(µ+ r − pH + (−1 + p)L)
(p2(µ2 + µ(r −H) + (−1 + p)(r −H)(H − L)))
The discriminant of the numerator of the DWL′ is non-negative if and only
if pH + (1− p)L ≥ µ+ r. If the discriminant is strictly negative, then the graph
of the DWL function is always increasing in the [0, 1) range. If the discriminant
is non-negative, then it is possible to have at most two local extrema of our
graph. If d2 exists, then it is easy to show that it lies outside (0,1) range.
Next Lemma will determine which type of extremum is the point d1, condi-
tional on lying in the (0, 1) range.
2.10.6 Type of Local Extremum
Lemma 9. If there is a local extremum of the DWL function d∗ in (0, 1) range
then it must be a local maximum.
Proof. If a local extremum of the DWL function exists, then the derivative of the
DWL function at that point should exist and it should be zero. This happens
only in a specific range of parameters, which satisfy the following inequality:
pH+(1−p)L ≥ µ+r, this corresponds to the case when the discriminant of the
numerator of the DWL′ is non-negative. Then, we know that limd→1−0 b(d)(1−
p + pd) = −∞ if pH + (1 − p)L > µ + r or limd→1−0 b(d)(1 − p + pd) = 0 if
pH + (1 − p)L = 0. The second limit follows from the fact that a quadratic
function goes to zero faster than a linear function. If pH + (1 − p)L > µ + r,
then d∗ cannot be local minimum, because otherwise there should exist a point x
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(d∗ < x < 1), such that x is local maximum. This contradicts the fact that there
can be only one local extremum point in the (0, 1) range. If pH+(1−p)L = µ+r,
thenDWL(d∗) > 0. IfDWL(d∗) ≤ 0, then there is no feasible contract available
(because the DWL function has only one non-negative root), which contradicts
the investment conditions derived in Proposition 1.
2.10.7 Proof of Lemma 7.
Proof. Claim 1: Suppose not, i.e. sL < cL − µ. It follows that we must have
bL = 1 Consider deviating to a contract where s′L = cL − µ and keep b′L = 1.
All other constraints remain unchanged, and so is the deadweight loss function,
proving the claim.
Claim 2: Suppose not, i.e. sH > cH − µ. There exists another payment
s′H = cH − µ− ε such that, upon receiving s′H the creditor still does not verify.
So, the deviation is profitable for the borrower, proving the claim.
Claim 3: This follows immediately from Claim 2: because in the high state
the creditor receives exactly cH − µ, if this quantity is less than L < r then PC
cannot hold.
Claim 4: If bM = 1, there cannot be strategic default (i.e., dH = 0), because
by defaulting the high-state borrower is always verified, and so repays cH >
cH − µ = sH , which is the repayment under truth-telling. But if dH = 0, then
we must have sM = sL = cL−µ and there can only be a separating equilibrium,
proving the claim.
Claim 5: Suppose by contradiction that V C0 is slack, i.e. sM < p(d)cH +
(1− p(d))cL − µ. Then, it must be that bM = 1, which by Claim 4 implies that
sM = cL − µ = p(d)cH + (1− p(d))cL − µ, reaching a contradiction.
Claim 6: Suppose that dL = 1, in which case it could be that bLcL + (1 −
bL)sL < bMcL + (1− bM)sM . As bL and sL are off-equilibrium, we can set them
so that the constraint holds with equality without loss of generality. Of course,
if dL = 0 then we have a separating equilibrium and bM can be set arbitrarily
so that the constraint holds with equality again, proving the claim.
Claim 7: First, observe that sM is a convex combination of sL and cH −µ >
L ≥ sL, which implies that sM ≥ sL. It follows that bL ≥ bM . In addition, when
dH > 0, we have sM > sL which implies that bL > bM .
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Claim 8: Recall that by Claim 6, ICL is binding. Define the function T :=
bLcL + (1 − bL)sL − bMcL − (1 − bM)sM = 0, where the equality follows from
Claim 6. Taking the derivative with respect to cL yields: ∂T/∂cL = bL−bM > 0.
Plugging sH from the binding ICh,1 into ICH,2, and observing that cH − µ >
L ≥ cL, proves the claim. This claim proves that there is no equilibrium when
the High type of borrower strategically pools upon sL.
Claim 9: Suppose not, i.e. sH > bMcH + (1− bM)sM . It follows that dH = 1,
and therefore for financing to take place it must be that p(d)cH + (1−p(d))cL−
µ > L. As a consequence, bM = 1, which implies that dH = 0: a contradiction.
Claim 10: Suppose not, i.e. sH = cH − µ < bMcH + (1 − bM)sM . Then we
must have a separating equilibrium where dL = dH = 0 and sM = sL = cL − µ.
In addition, PC reads: p(cH−µ)+(1−p)(bL(cL−µ)+(1−bL)sL) = r. Consider
deviating to b′L = bL − ε, such that ICH,1 still holds. As cL − µ = sL, PC does
not change, proving our claim.
2.10.8 Contract space without commitment
In this part of the appendix, we will discuss the set of feasible contracts in the
non commitment section. We will show that two repayment levels equilibrium
will be without loss of generality {sL, sH}.
Imagine there are three levels of repayments, where sM is a new repayment
level. Following Claim 8 of Lemma 7, we will consider the case when sL is
proposed only by the Low type. We will consider the case when sM is a pooling
repayment which is chosen (if sM repayment was separating, then this case is
trivial) by both types with probabilities dH and dL.
We will propose a new equilibrium where both the creditor and the borrower
will be weakly better off. Consider a deviation from the three repayment equi-
librium, so that both type of the borrower now put the weights dH and dL to
repayments sH and sL. IC and VC will be intact, so the incentive constraints
will be satisfied. Now, the creditor will additionally collect pdH(cH − µ) from
the High type and (1 − p)dL(cL − µ) from the Low type, but will not collect
((1−p)dL+pdH)(p(d)(cH−µ)+(1−p(d))(cL−µ)) from the pooling repayment
sM . This quantities are the same, because p(d) = pdH(1−p)dL+pdH . We showed that
the creditor will collect the same amount of money in the new equilibrium.
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Lemma 8 shows that if the borrower will redistribute the default weights dH
and dL to states H and L, then the value of the DWL function will be lower.
This proves that for any three repayment equilibrium exists a two repayment
equilibrium where the DWL is lower. The proof can be generalized to more than
three repayments by induction.
2.10.9 Proof of Lemma 8.
Proof. From Lemma 7, we can conclude that all constraints in the problem of
the borrower except ICH,2 hold as equalities. This will allow us to express the
verification probabilities bM and bL.
bM =
(cH − r − µ)dL
cHdL − rdL + dHµp− dLµp
bL =
(cH − r − µ)(dL(1− p) + dHp)
(1− p)(dL(cH − r) + µp(dH − dL))
So, DWL function will look next:
DWL = (1− p)(1− dL)bL(dL, dH) + ((1− p)dL + pdH)bM(dL, dH)
The derivative of the DWL function is positive with respect to dH for any
level of dL, so the optimal level of dH should be zero. This suggests that it is
in the interest of the borrower not to have the equilibrium repayment sM . This
Lemma shows the incentives of the borrower to separate the types when it is
possible(L ≥ µ) .
2.10.10 Proof of Proposition 4.
Proof. We will rewrite IC, VC and PC constraints in the next form:




sL = cL +




(1− p)(r − cL + µ)
(1− p)(r − cL + µ) + p(1− p+ pd)µ
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First, we will solve the relaxed problem, when we do not take into account
the limited liability constraint on sL. The DWL function will be next:
b(cL, d)(1− p+ pd) =
(1− p)(r − cL + µ)
(1− p)(r − cL + µ) + p(1− p+ pd)µ
(1− p+ pd)
The derivative of the above function with respect to d is positive and is negative
with respect to cL. So, it is optimal to set d = 0 and cL = L. Resulting cH will
be feasible because of the investment condition. And resulting sL will be in the
feasible range iff L ≥ µ. So, we have a solution for the parameter region L ≥ µ.
Next, we consider the parameter region L < µ. First, we consider the case
when cH is binding from above(it cannot be binding from below, otherwise it
contradicts the investment condition). We will have next DWL function:
b(d)(1− p+ pd) = H − µ− r
H − r − µp(1− d)
As in the previous case, the derivative with respect to d will be negative, so we
can set d as low as sL becomes binding. The condition that guarantees that the
resulting d is feasible is given by p ≥ pH−r
µ
.
The final case we consider is when sL is binding from below. We will have
next expression for b = r
r+µp(1−d) . Also, in this case the derivative of DWL with
respect to d is negative, so the minimum possible level we can set d is such that
the limited liability constraint on cL is binding. The condition that guarantees
the feasibility of cH is p < pH−rµ .
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3 The Third Chapter: Communication Mecha-
nisms in Competition
3.1 Introduction
Imagine two firms competing with each other for the right to finance a risky
project. Consider also the third party which cares about the efficiency of such
investments and has only the information channel of interaction with the players.
If one competitor is better informed about the project than the other one, would
it be possible for the third party to persuade a better informed competitor to
share part of his information about the project with a less informed one in
order to reduce the potential losses from inefficient investments? This paper
studies communication mechanisms that can be used in order to facilitate an
information flow between asymmetrically informed competitors in the static
setting for the sake of alleviating the problem of inefficient investments.
Information in markets is distributed unevenly - some market players may
have a better access to information sources than others. The asymmetric dis-
tribution of information may create the problem of inefficient distribution of
resources.24 There are various agencies in the markets which try to tackle the
inefficiency problems caused by the asymmetric distribution of information. The
role of these agencies is a facilitation of information exchange among the mar-
ket players. Some of these agencies are private and they sell their services to
the market players. In some countries, governments take an active role in the
regulation of the information exchange among market players.25
Generally, market agencies incentivise market players to reveal their private
information either by the pricing policy or by the regulation mechanism of the
state. I do not consider any mechanism which is based on the pricing policy. In
addition, I also do not consider any regulatory restrictions that oblige market
players to report their information.
In terms of dynamics, there can be different incentives of market players to
have information communication. The most important one is an information
24See Akerlof (1970), Spence (1973)
25The examples of private agencies are credit bureaus Equifax, Experian and TransUnion
in the American financial market. In Poland, Iran and other countries the market agencies
that collect and disseminate information are public.
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exchange incentive: a market player shares information with other players ex-
pecting that in the future they will share their information with him if they will
be better informed. However, if there is a short-term investor who is inclined to
a specific project, then the information exchange incentive is absent. This leads
to another feature of the model - the static framework allows to abstract from
such an obvious incentive as the information exchange one.
In the model, I consider two market players who compete for the right to
finance a risky project which requires fixed indivisible investment costs. One of
the players is better informed about the outcome of the project than the other.
Both players simultaneously announce their proposed shares in the project and
the lowest one wins the right to finance it. With some probability the project
will fail and the player who invested in the project will get nothing. In this
setting the problem of inefficient investments will arise - a less informed player
will invest in the project with a positive probability even in the case when a
more informed player gets a signal indicating that the project will fail.
In order to alleviate the problem of inefficient investments, I propose several
classes of communication mechanisms which allow information to flow from the
informed player to the uninformed one. I consider a mediator who collects
private information from the player on a voluntarily basis and commits to send
messages to the players based on the information collected. The objective of
the mediator is efficiency - he chooses among communication mechanisms to
minimise the level of inefficient investments by the uninformed player. If the
mediator chooses a mechanism which induces the informed player to reveal his
information, then there will be a transmission of information which may lead
the uninformed player to take better decisions given new information.
The general approach to this problem leads to the revelation principle. Fol-
lowing its logic, the mediator collects private information from the players in an
incentive compatible way and the players optimally choose the actions recom-
mended by the mediator.26 This approach brings the issue of intractability. The
main reason is the fact that the strategy space of each player is a continuum set.
This fact creates a continuum of incentive compatibility constraints which make
the problem so hard. Instead, I approach the problem with a more restrictive
26Myerson (1982): Without loss of generality, one can concentrate on this set of communi-
cation mechanisms.
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but tractable perspective: I consider subclasses of communication mechanisms
with finite message sets. So, the mediator will send the players a signal about
the outcome of the project rather than recommending which action to take.
This subclass of mechanisms seems natural.27 Examining the structure of these
subclasses is a step towards the understanding of the structure of the general
communication mechanisms set.
The first set of results of the paper asserts the informed player would never
reveal his private information if the mediator commits to send positive amount
of information to the uninformed player. In other words, the equilibrium ef-
fect of an information transmission to the uninformed player works against the
informed player. More information makes the uninformed player to bid more
aggressively and this negatively affects the informed player’s utility. Whether
information transmitted to the uninformed player is private or public will not
matter for the result.
In the second part of the paper, I analyse the set of communication mecha-
nisms where the mediator privately sends messages to both of the players. The
message to the informed player signals the type of the uninformed player. This
signal is the main tool which allows the mediator to incentivise the informed
player to reveal the private information. The intuition behind this result is
next: if the informed player knows that the project is not profitable, than shar-
ing information about it will not change his profits, since in any case he will not
participate in the bidding. On the other hand, if the project is profitable, than
lying about it will give the informed player less information about a bidding
behaviour of the uninformed player. So, the informed player trades his informa-
tion about the profitability of the project for the information about the bidding
behaviour of his competitor. In turn, more information about the uninformed
player leads to a weaker competition for the project which leads to higher utility
for the informed agent.
Another result of the second part of the paper gives the minimum bound on
the cardinality of the message set the mediator uses for the informed player. If it
is less than this bound, a message to the informed agent will not be informative
enough in the equilibrium to incentivise him to reveal private information. It is
27Obviously, a recommended action is also a signal about the outcome of the project.
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the bound on the informativeness of the signal to the informed player.
The third part of the paper analyses the set of communication mechanisms
where a message to the uninformed player is private and is public to the informed
player. When the message to the informed player is public, the mediator will
employ a different tool for the punishment of the informed player in the case
of lying.28 Due to the public nature of the message to the informed player,
the mediator by sending such a message changes the belief of the uninformed
player about the outcome of the project. So, the incentives of the informed
player to misreport his private information will depend on the behaviour of
the uninformed player after this deviation. More aggressive behaviour of the
uninformed player gives additional incentives to the informed agent to reveal
private information truthfully. If the informed agent will decide to lie, the
mediator will send a public message signaling the uninformed player about a
good outcome of the project. In turn, this induces the uninformed player to bid
more aggressively and reduces the utility of the informed player.
If one wants an information revelation from the informed agent under an
informative reporting policy 29 then either the cardinality of the informed agent’s
message space must be increased or messages to the informed player must have
a public component.
The last part of the paper considers different extensions of the model. I prove
that the problem of inefficient investments is not a first price auction specific.
Also, I discuss the case of verifiable messages and prove that the mediator will
not play any role.
Related Literature. The paper is related to two different strands of liter-
ature: auctions with asymmetrically informed bidders and information design.
The first strand of literature was started by Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and
Weber (1983), they showed that, in equilibrium, an uninformed bidder would get
a zero expected profit and a perfectly informed player would get a positive profit
in a first price sealed-bid auction. In my setting with the mediator, there will
exist cases where an informed bidder will have a second order uncertainty about
an uninformed bidder.30 I show the conditions under which the uninformed
28When the informed player misreports private information.
29To differentiate from the uninformative policy of the mediator, where an information
revelation comes for free.
30This happens in the case of private messages, when the uninformed player gets some
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player will get a positive profit in equilibrium. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber
(1983) consider common-value sequential auction between a perfectly informed
bidder and an uninformed bidder. They find that in equilibrium, the uninformed
bidder’s pay-off exceeds the informed bidder’s pay-off when the horizon is long
enough. In the static setting I consider, the equilibrium payoff of an informed
bidder always exceeds the one of uninformed.
The paper is also related to the information design literature. The paper
of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2004) studies a single agent persuasion problem.
In my paper, there are two players to persuade, so there is a need to track
higher order beliefs of the players. The paper of Bergemann and Morris (2019)
examines a general problem of information design in games. They do not con-
sider a problem of information design in the first price auction setting. The
paper of Bergemann, Brooks, and Morris (2017) considers various information
structures in a first price auction and characterise the lowest winning-bid distri-
bution. In my paper, I am charachterising optimal information structures from
the viewpoint of efficiency.
3.2 Framework
3.2.1 Environment
I consider three risk-neutral players - an informed player (IP), an uninformed
player (UIP) and an entrepreneur. The entrepreneur has a project with an un-
certain outcome which requires fixed indivisible amount of investments I. There
are two possible outcomes of the project θ ∈ Θ = {0, 1} 31. The entrepreneur
does not know the outcome of the project ex ante, as well as the players. I de-
note by p0 a prior probability the outcome of the project is 1. The probability
p0 is common knowledge.
The IP has an informational advantage: he gets an informative signal about
the outcome of the project. The signal is a function s : Θ → ∆{0, 1}. It
is correlated with the state θ. I denote by s(θ) the probability of a signal
realisation equal to 1 given the state.
information about the profitability of the project.
31I will also use the term state to denote the outcome of the project.
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s(1) := p(s = 1|θ = 1)
s(0) := p(s = 1|θ = 0)
The condition which shows that the signal is informative:
s(1) > s(0)
The signal realisation is private and is only observable by the informed player.
The structure of the signal is common knowledge.
Since the entrepreneur does not have opportunity to finance the project
himself, he runs a first price sealed-bid auction for the right to finance the
project. Each player bids his proposed share in the project. The lower bid wins
the auction and gives the right to claim corresponding share in the outcome of
the project. The players may choose not to participate in the auction. I call this
situation as proposing an empty contract. Non-participation of a given player
is not observable by the other player at the moment of bidding.
The timing of the game:
1. The informed player observes a signal realisation s about the outcome of
the project.
2. The players simultaneously bid αi where i ∈ {I, UI}. The bid may be an
empty contract.
3. The winner invests in the project.
4. The outcome of the project is realised and the winner gets his own share
in the outcome.
This game will be denoted as the Investment Game.
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3.2.2 Analysis of the Investment Game
The posterior beliefs of the informed player about the state after observing the
signal realisation equal to 1 or 0 will be denoted:
p′(1) := p(θ = 1|s = 1) = s(1)p0
s(1)p0 + s(0)(1− p0)
p′(0) := p(θ = 1|s = 0) = (1− s(1))p0
(1− s(1))p0 + (1− s(0))(1− p0)
I denote cumulative distribution functions of the players by FI(x) and FUI(x)
when they use mixed strategies in equilibrium.
The equilibrium characterisation of the Investment Game is presented be-
low.32
Claim 1. The equilibrium characterisation of the Investment Game
1) If p0 < I and p′(1) < I, in equilibrium the project is not financed.
2) If p0 < I and p′(1) ≥ I, in equilibrium the project is financed only by the
informed player after the signal realisation s = 1 . The winning bid is αI = 1.
The uninformed player does not participate in the auction.
3) If p0 ≥ I and p′(0) < I, there exists the unique equilibrium.
If the signal realisation is 0, the informed player bids an empty contract and
if the signal realisation is 1, he mixes in the interval [ I
p0





p0(x−I) , if x < 1
1, x=1
(3.1)
The uninformed player bids an empty contract with probability 1 − q and with
probability q mixes in the interval [ I
p0
, 1] according to the next cumulative
distribution function:
32Nash Equilibrium is used as an equilibrium concept.
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FUI(x) =
p′(1)x− I − uI
q(p′(1)x− I)
, where uI is the expected utility of the informed player after the signal real-
isation s = 1.
4) If p0 ≥ I and p′(0) ≥ I, in equilibrium the project is financed only by the
informed player. The equilibrium bids will be αI = αUI = Ip0 . The entrepreneur
always chooses the informed player to finance the project when the bids of the
players are equal.
The equilibrium characterisation of the Investment Game and the argument
about the uniqueness of equilibrium are in the Appendix. The important point
in the above proposition is the problem of inefficient investments, which occurs
only in the third case. In this case, the UIP will invest in an unprofitable project
with a positive probability after the IP gets the signal realisation s = 0. If the
signal realisation was public, then this case would never occur. From this point,
I will concentrate only on the parameter region 3, since it is of primary interest.
3.3 Communication
3.3.1 Communication Mechanisms
In this section, there will be definitions of communication mechanisms - systems
which allow for an incentive compatible communication among the players. In-
formally, one can interpret a communication mechanism as a mediator who col-
lects private information from the players on a voluntary basis and can commit
to send messages to the players as a function of the collected information. In the
paper, I will frequently use the mediator as an interpretation of communication
mechanisms.
First, following Myerson (1982), I will formally define a communication
mechanism (system) and then I will restrict attention to some subclasses of
communication mechanisms.
Definition 3. (M,A, p(a|m)) is a communication mechanism (system) of the
Investment Game, where M = (MI ,MUI) are sets from which the players send
messages, A = (AI , AUI) are sets from which the players get messages and
65
p(a|m) : M → ∆A is a rule which links each pair of messages (mI ,mUI) to the
conditional distribution function p(aI , aUI |mI ,mUI).33
With the use of communication mechanisms, the original Investment Game
will change, since the strategy space of the players will now include the message
sets (MI ,MUI) and the reporting function p(a|m) may change the first and
higher order beliefs of the players. I will call this new game as an Extended
Investment Game. Obviously, the structure of the game will be influenced by
the choice of a communication mechanism. Next, I consider the set of direct
communication mechanisms and the revelation principle.
Definition 4. A direct communication mechanisms is a communication mech-
anism such that M = (SI), A = (AI ,AUI), where SI is a set of types of the
informed player and AI and AUI are action sets of the players.
Claim 2. (Myerson(1982))
It is without loss of generality to consider only the set of truthful obedient equilib-
ria of the set of direct communication mechanisms. Where a truthful equilibrium
(mI(s), α) is an equilibrium of an Extended Investment Game induced by a direct
communication mechanism, where the informed player finds optimal to report
his type truthfully mI(s) = s. In addition, an equilibrium is obedient if the
players follow the recommendation of the reporting rule α = p(a|mI(s)).
The first constraint imposed by the truthful reporting will be denoted as an
incentive compatibility (IC) constraint. The second constraint is an obedience
constraint which tells that each player is better off if follows the recommendation
of the mediator.
The reporting policy of the mediator p(a|m) can be considered as a correlated
signal sent to the players. A recommendation to the player i: p(ai|m) delivers
the information both about the type of the other player and about the action
of the other player.
A truthful obedient equilibrium with a corresponding reporting rule in a di-
rect communication mechanism is a Bayesian Correlated Equilibrium. 34 Since,
the full characterisation of the set of Bayesian Correlated Equilibria proved to be
33I will use the terms "recommendation", "reporting function" and "reporting policy" to
denote the rule p(a|m).
34See Bergemann and Morris (2019).
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very hard task in the setting with continuum action sets, I will consider the set
of simple communication mechanism, where M = (SI) and A = (AI , AUI)
given that cardinalities of the sets AI and AUI are the same as the cardinality of
the set SI . This restriction limits the set of available mechanisms, but it gives
more tractability and a natural interpretation of the reporting policy p(a|m) as
a signal about the state rather than action recommendation.35 If at least one
of cardinalities of the finite sets AI and AUI is more than the one of SI , these
mechanisms will be called discrete communication mechanisms.
A reporting policy of a simple communication mechanism will take the next
form p : (SI) → ∆(AI × AUI). I will use the set {G,B} for AUI and {L,H}
for AI . Where the message "G" will be linked with the realisation of the signal
s = 1 and the message "B" with the realisation of the signal s = 0.
The following corollary allows to concentrate only on the set of truthful
equilibria of simple communication mechanisms.
Corollary 3. Myerson(1982)
It is without loss of generality to ignore the set of non-truthful equilibria (m(s), α) ∈
(S,∆A) of simple communication mechanisms.
3.3.2 The Second Best Reporting Policy
The second best reporting policy is a reporting policy of a communication
mechanism which maximises the sum of the utilities of the players and the
entrepreneur under the constraint that the mediator has the same information
about the signal s as the informed player.
Claim 3. The fully revealing reporting policy p(G|s = 1) = 1 and p(B|s = 0) =
1 of a simple communication mechanism is the second best reporting policy. 36
Proof. If the mediator is informed as well as the IP, he will use whole his infor-
mation power to minimise the probability of investment in the project by the
UIP after the signal realisation s = 0.37 The fully revealing reporting policy
does it perfectly. Once the posterior of the UIP about the state is below the
35As was mentioned earlier, a recommended action also has information about the state.
36p(mUI |s) denotes a reporting probability to the UIP of the message mUI when a message
to the IP is integrated out.
37It is easy to show that this problem is equivalent to the maximisation of the sum of the
utilities of the players and the entrepreneur.
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investment costs I the UIP will bid an empty contract with probability 1. This
will drop the probability of inefficient investments by the UIP to the same level
as for the IP.
For the fully revealing reporting policy, the utility of IP will be zero, since the
full information revelation of the mediator completely destroys the information
rent of the IP.
3.4 Communication Results
3.4.1 One side communication
In this section, I will consider two subsets of simple communication mechanisms:
the first is the case when the informed player always gets uninformative messages
and the second is when the message to the informed player is perfectly correlated
with the message to the uninformed player. The reporting policies of such
communication mechanisms will be called pure private and pure public reporting
policies since they correspond to the cases of private and public reporting to the
UIP.
In the case when the mediator sends messages mUI to the UIP, I will use the
reporting policy p(mUI |s). I will consider only consistent reporting policies38:
p(G|s = 1) ≥ p(G|s = 0)
In addition, I will outline the set of informative reporting policies among con-
sistent ones - for which the above inequality holds strictly.
Following Kamenica and Gentzkow (2004), I can represent the reporting pol-
icy p(mUI |s) in terms of the distribution of posteriors of the UIP (pUI(B), pUI(G)).
Each posterior is an updated belief of the UIP about the state θ after a message
from the mediator39:
pUI(mUI) := p(θ = 1|mUI)
38Concentration on consistent policies is without loss of generality, since if there is a report-
ing function such that the above inequality does not hold, it is possible to change the labels
of the messages "G" and "B" with each other, so the inequality above eventually will hold.
39The condition that guarantees the feasibility of a pair of the posteriors is: (1 −
p(G))pUI(B) + p(G)pUI(G) = p0 , where p(G) is an unconditional probability of sending
the message "G" to the UIP by the mediator.
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First, I will consider pure public reporting policies. In this case, the IP will
perfectly know a message sent to the UIP by the mediator. This corresponds to
public simple communication mechanisms where p(mI = mUI |mUI) = 1.
Claim 4. There does not exist a truthful equilibrium of an Extended Investment
Game for any informative public simple communication mechanism.
The proof in the Appendix is divided into two parts. First, I find all equilibria
of an Extended Investment Game for a pure public reporting assuming that the
mediator knows as much as the IP.40 Second, I find the reporting policies which
are compatible with incentives of the IP to reveal his information about the
signal realisation. This approach will be used also in the subsequent claims.
The intuition behind this result is very simple: since the information flow
from the IP to the UIP makes the later bid more aggressively in equilibrium,
then the former will never have an incentive to truthfully report the information
to the mediator. Any information transmission will decrease the utility levels of
the IP.
The second case is a case with pure private reporting to the UIP, when the
IP does not observe the message the UIP received from the mediator. This
corresponds to private simple communication mechanisms where p(mI |G) =
p(mI |B).
Claim 5. There does not exist a truthful equilibrium of an Extended Investment
Game for any informative private simple communication mechanism.
The proof of the above claim is in the Appendix. The equilibrium effect of
an informative reporting policy plays against the IP. More information makes
the UIP bid even more aggressively than in the previous case, since now the UIP
knows that the IP has uncertainty about the message the opponent received.
This, in turn, destroys incentives of the IP to share the information with the
mediator if the later is committed to the informative reporting policy.
The results of the above claims leads to the consideration of more compli-
cated reporting policies of the mediator. With a reacher mechanism set, there
may be a hope to create incentives for the IP to reveal his information.
40I call it an equilibrium search part.
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3.4.2 General reporting policies: Private messages
Due to the fact that there is no role for the mediator in the cases of pure public
and pure private reporting, I will consider the whole set of simple communication
mechanisms with a pair of reporting functions p(mUI |s) and p(mI |mUI , s) to
the UIP and to the IP accordingly. A pair of (p(mUI |s), p(mI |mUI , s)) will
give a joint distribution function which is a general reporting rule of a simple
communication mechanism:
p(mI ,mUI |s) = p(mI |mUI , s)p(mUI |s)
In this part, I assume that a message sent to the IP will be private41. With
the private reporting to the IP, there will be different types of the IP from the
perspective of the UIP.
Before trying to find equilibria for different reporting policies, it is worth to
think about the reporting policies in this setting, namely, the private reporting
policy to the IP. I will use the consistency condition for these policies:
p(H|mUI = G, s) ≥ p(H|mUI = B, s) ∀s
As in the previous section, this is without loss of generality. The definition of
the informative reporting policy will now also include the informativeness of the
reporting policy to the IP (when the above inequality is strict at least after one
signal realisation).
The IP will have a posterior about the message sent to the UIP, which will
depend on both a signal realisation and a message received from the mediator.42
Next, I am partially characterising the set of truthful equilibria of informative
simple communication mechanisms. It is important to understand the structure
of this set in order to find necessary conditions that an optimal information
reporting policy satisfies.
Claim 6. In any truthful equilibrium of an informative simple communication
41Obviously, the message to the UIP should also be private, otherwise we are in the case of
pure public policies.
42In addition, for every signal realisation s, the condition that an expected posterior
of a message mUI is equal to the prior should hold: p(mUI |s) = p(L|s)p(mUI |L, s) +
p(H|s)p(mUI |H, s) ∀s
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mechanism:
1) Both types of the IP are bidding non-empty contracts mixing in their
bidding sets XHI and XLI , where minXLI = maxXHI . Both types of the IP get
positive utility in expectation with the "L" type getting weakly higher utility.
2) If the "B" type of the UIP is bidding then minXBUI = maxXGUI . The "B"
type of the UIP will always get zero utility. If the "B" type of the UIP is bidding,
then necessarily the "G" type of the UIP is bidding and gets positive utility.
3) The Low type of the IP will never bid according to the degenerate proba-
bility distribution.
The claim gives a list of properties every truthful equilibrium should satisfy
given an informative reporting policy. The first part of the claim outlines the fact
that after the message "L" the IP will bid more aggressively rather than after
"H". It is clear that the posterior of the IP that the message "G" was sent to the
UIP will drop after "L", which will make the IP more "optimistic". Surprisingly,
if the "B" type of the UIP is bidding, he will bid more aggressively than the "G"
type. It is explained by the fact that the marginal rate of substitution between
a bid and a probability of winning is higher for the "B" type.
The crucial point for the third part is the same level of expected utility of
the different types of the IP. If the IP after the "L" message is bidding according
to the degenerate distribution, then from Claim 6, the bid should be αLI = 1. In
this case, the IP gets the same expected utility both after "L" and "H" messages.
By misreporting the signal realisation, the IP will boost the probability of the
"B" message, which will rise his expected utility.
The interest of the mediator is to minimise the probability of investments in
the project by the UIP after the signal realisation s = 0. The main constraint
that the mediator takes into account is (IC) which tells that the IP has incentives
to report the signal realisation truthfully43. The other constraints are feasibility
and consistency constraints. (IC) is formulated in a general way, since the form
of the expected utility function of the IP after the signal realisation s = 1 will
depend on the concrete reporting policy. The problem of the mediator is given
below:
43Obviously (IC) is formulated with respect to signal realisation s = 1, since if s = 0 there
is always weak incentives to report truthfully.
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min
p(mUI |s),p(mI |mUI ,s)
p(G|s = 0)qG + p(B|s = 0)qB
subject to:
uI(m = 1|s = 1) ≥ uI(m = 0|s = 1) (IC)
p(G|s = 1) ≥ p(G|s = 0), p(H|mUI = G, s) ≥ p(H|mUI = B, s) ∀s (CC)
p(mUI |s) ∈ [0, 1], p(mI |mUI , s) ∈ [0, 1] (FC)
Next claim finds an optimal reporting policy and proves that there is no role
for the mediator.
Claim 7. Characterisation of an optimal reporting policy
1) Exists an optimal reporting policy, where the reporting function to the IP
after the signal realisation s = 0 is uninformative: p(L|G, s = 0) = p(L|B, s =
0).
2) The uninformative reporting function to the UIP is optimal: p(G|s = 1) =
p(G|s = 0).
The first part of the claim follows from the logic that the RHS of (IC) which
is the utility of the IP in the case of misreport of the signal should be as low as
possible - it gives the mediator additional freedom in choice of reporting policies.
The part of the reporting function p(mI |mUI , s = 0) can be chosen in such a way
to maximise the incentives of the IP to report the signal realisation truthfully.
The uninformative reporting policy after s = 0 will do this job, it optimally
punishes the IP in the case of misreport.
The second part of the proof is crucial. It tells that the equilibrium forces
44 do not allow the mediator to use the information power fully. It means
there does not exist an equilibrium of an Extended Investment Game such that
different types of the IP strictly prefer all of their optimal actions to the ones of
the other type. For all of the equilibrium types found, it is not the case: both







of the types of the IP have a common optimal action αI = t.45 In this respect,
the equilibrium forces do not allow the mediator to send an enough informative
message mI such that different types of the IP have disjoint optimal actions
sets. If different types of the IP find a common optimal action then there is
not enough spread between the posteriors p(G|mI , s = 1) about the type of the
UIP. The reason is that for a sufficiently informative message mI which induces
different optimal actions sets for different types of the IP, there will not exist
an equilibrium.46
3.4.3 A Positive Result: Strategy Space
The impossibility result for the simple communication mechanisms gives a clue
how to construct a communication mechanism which will increase an efficiency
of investments in the Investment Game.
I consider now discrete communication mechanisms with MUI = {B,G}
and MI = {L,M,H}. The reason why I consider such a mechanism is the
possibility that one type of the IP will not have an optimal action which will be
also optimal for the other type. The most important point is allowing the IP to
utilise the information provided by the mediator. To overcome the equilibrium
forces which do not allow to send sufficiently informative messages to the IP,
I need to make different types of the IP to have mixing regions which do not
coincide even in a single point. Very different mixing regions of different types
of the IP will correspond to the better use of the signal mI by the IP.
The first part of Claim 7 will hold also in this case - the punishment in the
case of the misreport by the IP should be an uninformative message mI :
p(mI |G, s = 0) = p(mI |B, s = 0)
Below, I present an example of an informative reporting policy of a discrete
communication mechanism which alleviates the problem of inefficient invest-
ments.
45t is an equilibrium threshold of different types of the IP. See the Appendix.
46If XI transforms to a non-connected set due to a sufficiently informative mI , there will
be a profitable deviation of the "G" type of the UIP.
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An example of an incentive compatible informative reporting pol-
icy.
Consider the case of the fully informative signal p′(1) = 1 and the parameter
values p0 = 0.6 and I = 0.56. The reporting policy is given below:
p(H|G, s = 1) = 0.5 p(M |G, s = 1) = 0.4
p(H|B, s = 1) = 0.08 p(M |B, s = 1) = 0.1
p(G|s = 1) = 0.25 p(G|s = 0) = 0.06
This reporting policy supports modified type 4 equilibrium from Claim 6.
In this equilibrium "G" type of the UIP bids in [γ, 1] and the "B" type bids
an empty contract with probability 1. The "L" type of the IP bids unity with
probability 1, the "H" type bids in [γ, t] and the "M" type in [t, 1]. The resulting
probability of the inefficient investments p(G|s = 0) = 0.06, which is less than
the probability of inefficient investments in the absence of the mediator q =
p0−I
1−I = 0.08.
This example shows a positive role of the mediator in the class of discrete
communication mechanisms.
3.4.4 Public messages
The next step in the analysis of the Investment Game is a consideration of
public reporting policies which may give the mediator additional tool to increase
efficiency in this framework. The reporting rule will have a public component
p(mI |mUI , s). So, the mediator sends a public message mI to the IP given a
private message mUI to the UIP.
There are two possible effects of such reporting policies on the outcome of
the Investment Game. With the public reporting policy the posterior of the UIP
will change after the mediator sends a message to the IP. This gives less control
over the posteriors of the UIP which can play in any direction. The other effect
of the public reporting is an equilibrium effect. And it is also not clear where it
will drive the outcome of the Investment Game.
From the technical point of view a communication mechanism with a public
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reporting policy is a discrete communication mechanism. The reason is that the
UIP will get two messages: one is a private message from the mediator and the
second message is perfectly correlated with the message mI sent to the IP. So,
the cardinality of the MUI grows to 4.
I characterise the set of truthful equilibria of communication mechanisms
with public reporting. The first part comes from Claim 5, where instead of
p(mUI |s = 1), I have p(mUI |mI , s = 1), so the IP has additional information
about the message sent to the UIP. In addition, the UIP will update the posterior
about the state given the message to the IP, since this message may have some
information about the signal realisation.
Claim 8. In any truthful equilibrium in the case of public reporting:
1) The IP always bids a non-empty contract and gets strictly positive utility
levels after the signal realisation s = 1. The utility of the IP after "L" is not
always higher than after "H".
2) If the "B" type of the UIP is bidding then minXBI = maxXGI . The "B"
type of the UIP will always get zero utility. If the "B" type of the UIP is bidding,
then necessarily the "G" type of the UIP is bidding and gets positive utility.
3) Both after the "H" and "L" messages, the UIP cannot bid a non-empty
bid with probability one.
4) Non-bidding behaviour of the UIP is higher after "H" than after "L":
(1− q)(H) > (1− q)(L) iff p(H|s = 1) > p(H|s = 0).
All equilibria in this subclass of mechanisms are obtained when pUI(mUI)
is replaced with pUI(mUI ,mI) and p(G|s) with p(G|mI , s) in Claim 5. The
parametric conditions will stay intact up to mI . The first two properties of the
claim automatically follow from Claim 5. The third and the forth properties are
proved in the Appendix.
The essence of the above claim is the fact that the mediator punishes the
deviation of the IP from reporting s = 1 to s = 0 by more aggressive bidding
behaviour of the UIP. For example, if the bidding probability of the UIP is
higher after "H" message, then, in the case of deviation of the IP, the mediator
will try to send message "H" with a higher probability. If the IP decides to
misreport the realisation of the signal, he will face the different frequency of the
actions of the UIP which will serve as a punishment. It is important to notice
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that the punishment in the case of a misreport of the signal realisation is not
necessarily a less informative reporting rule to the IP.
There exist examples of an incentive compatible informative public reporting
policy that alleviate the problem of inefficient investments.
3.4.5 Comparison of public reporting and private reporting
It is worth to think about the difference between private and public reporting
policies. The crucial point in the comparison is the mechanism which extract
information from the IP. In the case of public reporting, the mediator will punish
the IP by choosing a public reporting policy that changes the action distribution
of the UIP not in favour of the IP. Since, the probability distribution of the
message mI changes with the report of the IP about the signal realisation, the
bidding behaviour of the UIP will be affected by the fact of misreporting. The
fact of misreporting may induce the UIP to bid more aggressively and this, in
turn, will reduce the utility of the IP. This is an exact mechanism of punishment
of the IP in the case of lying in the public reporting case.
In the case of the private reporting, the mechanism of inducing the IP to
submit the correct signal realisation is different. The message mI is observable
only by the IP, so less correlation between mI and mUI in case of misreporting
may induce the IP to bid less precisely. In turn, less precise bidding will reduce
the rent of the IP. So, in the case of private reporting the way of punishment of
the informed player works through the information channel. The incentives to
report truthfully (about the profitability of the project) may be explained also
in a different way: the informed player will give a piece of his information about
the project in exchange of a weaker competition from the uninformed player.
This is achieved through a more informative signal to the informed agent about
the bidding behavior of the uninformed agent in case the former reports to the
mediator that the project is profitable. In case, the project is not profitable,
than the informed agent is weakly better off to report the state, since in any case
he will not take part in the auction. As a result, a weaker competition which
serves as an incentivisation mechanism to share the information will increase
the profits of the informed agent.
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3.5 Extensions
3.5.1 The Second Price Auction
The inefficiency of resource distribution that arises in the framework may be
a first price auction specific. So, there is a hope that in another format of an
auction such inefficiency may not be present. In this extension, I analyse what
happens in the case of a second price auction.
In the second price auction, the lowest bid wins and the winner gets share
of the higher bid. There should be also a specification what happens if a player
bids an empty contract. In case one of the bidders bid empty contract, then
the other one should get maximum share of 1. In the case both of the players
bid empty contract, then the project will not be financed. This is a natural
adaptation of the second price auction to the setting.
Claim 9. If I < p(s = 0), then there does not exist an equilibrium where the
uninformed player bids an empty contract with certainty.
Proof. Assume there exists such an equilibrium. Then in this equilibrium, the
IP would bid αI after the signal realisation of s = 1 and an empty contract after
the signal realisation of s = 0. So the IP would win the auction after the s = 1
and otherwise the project would not be financed. The UIP may deviate from
the strategy and to undercut the IP by bidding αI − ε. In this case, the utility
of the UIP would be:
uUI(αI − ε) = p0(s(1)αI + (1− s(1))1) + (1− p0)(s(0)αI + (1− s(0))1)− I =
= p(s = 1)αI + p(s = 0)− I
The condition that guarantees that the above expression is weakly less than zero
:
αI ≤
I − p(s = 0)
p(s = 1)
Since, the right hand side of the equation can be negative, then such a profitable
deviation of the UIP will exists in some cases. So, an equilibrium where the UIP
bids an empty contract may not exist.
Remark: I do not allow the negative bids in this framework. The cost of
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allowing it is the fact that there will exist equilibria where one of the player is
bidding −∞ and wins the project for sure. In such equilibria, the entrepreneur
will get zero utility which suggests that he will never choose such a format.
3.5.2 The case of verifiable messages
I consider the case of verifiable messages when the IP gets an evidence about
the signal realisation he received. Then, the IP cannot lie about the signal
realisation, but he can choose not to report anything to the mediator.
Claim 10. For the case of verifiable messages, the Second Best Reporting Policy
is feasible.
Proof. In the case when the realisation of signal is equal to 0, the IP has weak
incentives to report his signal realisation truthfully, since he is indifferent with
respect to action of the other player, and he knows that, in any case, he will
not participate in the auction. After the realisation of the signal equal to 1,
the IP has a choice of sending an empty message or a truthful report to the
mediator. Any choice of the IP will be interpreted as a message equal to the
signal realisation s = 1. It is the unraveling result. The mediator will get the
information about the signal realisation "for free" and will truthfully reveal it
to the UIP. The Second Best Reporting Policy will be feasible.
As the proof shows, the mediator has the second best reporting policy when
the IP is subject to verifiable information. The conflict of interests between
the different types of the IP creates a possibility for the truthful information
revelation. The result of the claim will be overturned if the mediator does not
have a power to choose an equilibrium of the continuation-game starting after
the signal realisation s = 0. In this case, the result is not robust to the next
logic: the IP will think that if after the signal realisation s = 0, he would reveal
the outcome of the signal, then he would lose a possibility not to reveal the
information in the case of the signal realisation s = 1. Losing this possibility
diminishes the information rent of the IP, since it affects his information advan-
tage. The IP after the realisation of the signal s = 0 will choose the equilibrium
in which he does not reveal the information to the mediator.
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Remark. The same result as in the above claim may be achieved if there
is a direct communication between the players and the uninformed player can
choose an equilibrium of the continuation-game. So, the role of the media-
tor is completely determined by his ability to choose an equilibrium of the
continuation-game after the signal realisation s = 0.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I investigate the role of communication mechanisms in a compet-
itive setting. The emphasis of my analysis is devoted to the information role
such mechanisms play in order to alleviate the problem of inefficient distribution
of resources due to asymmetric distribution of information.
I investigate several classes of communication mechanisms: one side com-
munication, private reporting and public reporting. The negative results with
respect to one side communication and simple communication mechanisms di-
rected me to consider more sophisticated discrete mechanisms which allow in-
centive compatible communication.
Although my analysis partially characterises an optimal reporting policy, the
claims identify the main driving forces of information revelation in private and
public reporting. In addition, my analysis revealed the difference between pri-
vate and public reporting rules. For the private case the information punishment
that the mediator uses allow the informed player to share some information with
the uninformed player. For the public reporting, the mediator uses a punishment
method which forces the uninformed player to bid more aggressively.
The results obtained in this paper inform the future research about the
methods one can use to approach questions of information design in compet-
itive environments. Also one will be more informed about the problems and
challenges in the analysis of these topics.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Proof of Claim 1
Proof. 1) p0 < I and p′(1) < I. It is easy to see that the expected revenue from
the project is less than the cost of investment I for both of the players, so the
decision of non-investment is optimal.
2)p0 < I and p′(1) ≥ I. The signal to the informed player is informative
enough, so after the realisation s = 1, the posterior belief is (weakly) above
the investment costs I. In this case the IP knows that he is the only one who
will bid a non-empty contract. This allows him to bid the highest possible bid
αI = 1. The UIP does not invest for the same reason as in case 1.
3) p0 ≥ I and p′(0) ≤ I. The UIP’s prior is above the investment costs I.
There is a rationale for the UIP to bid a non-empty contract.
In equilibrium none of the players will bid according to the pure strategies.
If you are bidding according to the pure strategy then necessarily you are the
IP and you bid αI ≤ Ip0 in order not to be undercut. But, in this case the UIP
will bid en empty contract, which makes the initial bid of the IP suboptimal.
First, I give an equilibrium of the Investment Game. Second, I will sketch a
proof why it is the unique equilibrium.
The IP bids a non-empty contract iff he receives the signal realisation s = 1.
After the signal realisation s = 1, the IP mixes in the interval [ I
p0
, 1] according




The expected utility of the informed player after the signal realisation s = 1
will be:
UI(s = 1) = ((1− q) + q(1− FUI(αI)))(p′(1)αI − I)
For any equilibrium action αI of the IP, his utility should be the same and
should be equal to uI . This condition alongside with the regularity conditions
on the probability bounds give the cumulative distribution function and the
bidding probability of the UIP with the utility level of the IP.
FUI(x) =











The expected utility function of the UIP will be equal to:
UUI = p0(s(1)(1− FI(αUI)) + (1− s(1)))(αUI − I)+
+(1− p0)(s(0)(1− FI(αUI)) + (1− s(0)))(−I)
In equilibrium, the utility level of the UIP is equal to zero. The zero utility




p0s(1)x−I(p0s(1)+(1−p0)s(0)) , if x < 1
1, x=1
The condition limx→ 1−0 FI(x) ≤ 1 follows from the fact p′(0) ≤ I. This means
that the IP puts an atom on the αI = 1.
The cumulative distribution functions of the players constitute a mixed strat-
egy equilibrium of the game.
Uniqueness.
To prove that the above equilibrium is unique, I will need to establish several
observations. I denote by XI and XUI the mixing regions of the players.
To avoid the problem of non-measurable sets and inability to prescribe prob-
abilities to these sets, I concentrate on mixing regions of each players consisting
of at most countable number of disjoint open intervals and at most countable
number of atomic points.
The first observation states that in any equilibrium supXUI = supXI = 1
and, in addition, the IP will have an atom at point αI = 1 and the UIP does
not have an atom at αUI = 1.
First, I show that supXUI = supXI . Without loss of generality, assume that
supXUI < supXI . It means that either IP has an atom at supXI or an open
interval (a, supXI) ⊂ XI for some a > supXUI . There cannot be such an open
interval, since the IP would shift any mass from (supXUI , supXI) to the point
αI = 1. It is a profitable deviation of the IP. Imagine that there is a atom at
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supXI . In this case, the UIP will have always an incentive to undercut the IP,
since moving a mass from (supXUI − γ, supXUI) ⊂ XUI 47 to supXI − ε for
small enough ε, γ > 0 will be profitable for the UIP. A contradiction.
Second, imagine that the IP does not have an atom at supXI . If the UIP
has an atom at supXI , then his expected utility will be negative. The reason
is that by bidding αUI = supXI , the UIP will win only after s = 0. If the UIP
does not have an atom, then for αUI arbitrary close to supXI , the expected
utility will be negative for the same reason. This gives us a contradiction. If the
UIP has an atom at αUI = supXUI , then the IP will always have an incentive
to undercut the UIP by bidding αI = supXI − ε instead of αI = supXI . So, it
cannot occur in equilibrium.
Third, imagine supXUI = supXI < 1. Then, there will always be a deviation
for the IP - he will put his atom at αI = 1 and gain strictly higher utility. A
contradiction. The first observation is proved.
The second observation states that in any equilibrium XI = XUI ∪ {1}. I
assume the opposite, so, without loss of generality, exists either an atom a ∈ XI
and a /∈ XUI ∪{1} or exists an an interval (t1, t2) ⊂ XI and (t1, t2) 6⊂ XUI ∪{1}.
First, consider the case of an atom a ∈ XI and a /∈ XUI ∪ {1}. Then, there
will exist an element a + ε ∈ XUI ∪ {1} for any arbitrary small ε, since a 6= 1.
48 By moving a weight from (a, a + ε) to (a, a − ε), the UIP will be strictly
better off, since for an infinitesimal decrease in the winning bid the increase of
the winning probability will be finite and positive.
Second, consider the case of an interval (t1, t2) ⊂ XI \{1} and (t1, t2) 6⊂ XUI .
Obviously, there will exist the b = inf{x ∈ XUI |x ≥ t2}. this case, the IP will
be better off if he puts a probability weight from the (t1, t2) to b − ε for ε > 0
small enough. In this way, the IP will undercut the UIP and earn additional
utility. This proves the second observation.
The third observation states that, in any equilibrium, the mixing regions are
connected sets. Without loss of generality, imagine that XI is not connected,
than ∃(t1, t2) 6⊂ XI 49 and b, c ∈ XI such that c < t1 < t2 < b. Obviously,
∃l = inf{x ∈ XI |x ≥ t2} and ∃m = sup{x ∈ XI |x ≤ t1} such that m < t1 <
47Or, an atom from supXUI .
48If such an element does not exist, then see the second case.
49The case when there is only one point instead of an interval is trivial.
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t2 < l. Then, there is a rationale for the IP to move a probability weight from
(m− ε,m)50 to the point a− γ with small enough γ > 0 and ε > 0 for the next
reason: with this move the IP will get a higher share in the project with the
same probability of winning in the auction.51 This leads to the fact that the
mixing sets of the players are connected.
The forth point is the fact that the only atom in the mixing regions is due to
the IP when he bids αI = 1. Imagine that there is an atom a ∈ XI , then there
will be an incentives for the UIP to deviate from all his bids αUI ∈ [a, a+ ε] to
the point a − γ with small enough γ > 0. The point where this logic does not
work is αI = 1. The other points where the UIP cannot undercut the IP are
αI ≤ Ip0 , but they will not be played in equilibrium. The same reasoning is true
for the UIP. The point αUI = 1 was discussed in the observation 1.
The fifth observation is minX = I
p0
. Imagine minX > I
p0
, then the UIP
would get a positive utility and would never bid an empty contract. There will
not exist an equilibrium where the UIP is bidding an empty contract with zero
probability, since the IP in that case will never bid αI = 1.
These five claims establish the fact that the mixing region of each player
should be the set [ I
p0
, 1]. The equilibrium I found above is the only possible
equilibrium in this region.
4) p0 ≥ I and p′(0) > I. The IP will bid a non-empty contract after any
signal realisation . In equilibrium, the UIP and the IP after any signal realisa-
tion will bid I
p0
and the entrepreneur will always choose the IP to allocate the




− I) > 0 and zero for the UIP. For the IP there is no sense of decreasing
or increasing the bid, since in either case the utility will be less than the one
above. For the UIP there will not be any profitable deviations as well. There
will not exist an equilibrium in mixed strategies similar to the 3rd part of the
proof because p′(0) > I, which will make limx→ 1−0 FI(x) > 1.
50Or, m if it has an atom.
51Here, I am using the previous observation.
52Any other allocation of the project will destroy the equilibrium, since it gives the incentives
to the IP to undercut the UIP in this case.
83
3.7.2 Proof of Claim 4
Proof. If the IP observes mUI , then from Claim 1, I know the equilibrium of
an Extended Investment Game given a reporting policy p(mUI |s). 53 The
equilibrium form and the uniqueness follows from Claim 1, where instead of
a prior p0, there will be a posterior of the UIP pUI(mUI). The expected utility
of the IP after the signal realisation s = 1 will be:
UI = ((1−p(G|s = 1))(1−qB(pUI(B)))+p(G|s = 1)(1−qG(pUI(G))))(p′(1)−I)
, where 1 − qmUI is the probability the UIP bids an empty contract after the
message mUI .
Given that for every consistent reporting policy pUI(B) ≤ pUI(G), the ex-
pected utility of the IP is decreasing with p(G|s = 1). To satisfy (IC) constraint
of the IP, the utility under truth-telling should be (weakly) higher than under
misreporting. It is obvious from the utility function of the IP that to satisfy
(IC) the next condition is necessary:
p(G|s = 1) ≤ p(G|s = 0)
There is only one consistent reporting policy which is satisfying above in-
equality - the uninformative reporting policy:
p(G|s = 1) = p(G|s = 0)
So, the only way for the mediator to induce truth-telling from the IP is
sending uninformative messages to the UIP, which proves that the mediator has
no role.
3.7.3 Proof of Claim 5
Proof. The proof is structured in the same manner as the one for Claim 4.
First, I find all equilibria for every consistent reporting policy dropping (IC)
and, second, I find the reporting policies that are incentive compatible.
53Assuming that (IC) constraint will be considered later in the proof.
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There will be some preliminary observations. I will denote by the XGUI and
XBUI the mixing sets of the different types of the UIP. I define XUI = XGUI ∪
XBUI . Following the Uniqueness part of Claim 1, it is easy to show that at any
equilibrium in the case of pure private reporting policies: 1) supXUI = supXI =
1, 2) XUI ∪ {1} = XI , 3) XUI and XI are connected sets 4) Only possible
probability atom is αI = 1. In addition, minXBUI = maxXGI whenever the "B"
type bids a non-empty contract with positive probability. If minXBUI < maxXGI
, then there will be a profitable deviation of the "B" type of the UIP. The
observation from Claim 1 that minXUI = minXI = Ip0 is not a necessarily
condition, since the possibility to have different types of the UIP allows the "G"
type in some cases to have a positive utility in equilibrium.
For the part of the equilibrium search, I will analyse two cases pUI(B) < I
and pUI(B) ≥ I.
Case 1: pUI(B) < I.
The UIP after the message "B" will bid an empty contract, since his posterior
is less than the costs of investments.
1) I consider the first type of equilibrium. In this equilibrium the UIP after
"G" message will bid in range [ I
pUI(G)
, 1] with probability qG and an empty
contract with 1− qG. The IP will bid in the range [ IpUI(G) , 1].
The expected utility of the UIP after the message "G" will be:
UGUI = pUI(G)(s(1)(1− FI(x)) + (1− s(1)))(x− I)+
+(1− pUI(G))(s(0)(1− FI(x)) + (1− s(0)))(−I)
Since, the expected utility of the UIP should be 0, the resulting cumulative





, if x < 1
1, x=1
(3.2)
limx→ 1−0 FI(x) < 1 follows from p′(0) < I. The expression pUI(G)s(1) +
(1− pUI(G))s(0) will be denoted as EGs.
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The expected utility of the IP after the signal realsiation s = 1 will be:
UI(s = 1) = (1−p(G|s = 1)+p(G|s = 1)(1−qG+qG(1−FUI(αI)))(p′(1)αI−I)
The resulting cumulative distribution function of the UIP will be:
FGUI(x) =
p′(1)x− I − uI
qGp(G|s = 1)(p′(1)x− I)










p(G|s = 1) ≥ p
′(1)(pUI(G)− I)
pUI(G)(p′(1)− I)
I call the above condition a parametric restriction, since from the viewpoint
of the players the reporting policy is a parameter of the model.
2)The second type of equilibrium involves the UIP to earn a positive utility
and bid in the range [γ, 1].
Following the argument from part 1), the cumulative distribution function





, if 0≤x < 1
1, x=1
(3.3)
The cumulative distribution function of the UIP will have the same form as
in the previous case with qG = 1.
γ will be determined from the feasibility conditions on the cumulative dis-
tribution function of the UIP:
γ =









p(G|s = 1) ≤ p
′(1)(pUI(G)− I)
pUI(G)(p′(1)− I)
The two parametric conditions listed in the above sub-cases span whole para-
metric space. This completes the first case.
Case 2: pUI(B) ≥ I.
The first type of equilibrium will remain intact with the identical parametric
restriction. If the expected utility of the UIP after "G" is zero, then utility of
the UIP after "B" will be less than zero if he is bidding a non-empty contract.
The second type of equilibrium is similar to the second type of the first case
if I add the no-bidding condition of the "B" type. The reason why the UIP after
"B" will not bid is because his best choice is bidding αUI = 1 which gives the
UIP non-positive utility under the condition:
p′(1)(pUI(B)− I)(pUI(G)s(1)− IEGs)
pUI(G)(p′(1)− I)(pUI(B)s(1)− IEBs)
≤ p(G|s = 1)
There is the third type of equilibrium in this case. After the message "B",
the UIP bids empty contract with probability 1− qB and bids in the region [t, 1]
with probability qB and after the message "G", he bids in the region [γ, t]. The
IP randomizes in [γ, 1].
The IP should mix according to the next cumulative distribution function





, if γ ≤x ≤ t
pUI(B)x−I
pUI(B)s(1)x−IEBs
, if t <x < 1
(3.4)
The utility level uGUI will be pinned down from the boundary condition on the
distribution function FI(0) = 0:
uGUI = pUI(G)γ − I
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In addition, there should be a continuity condition on the distribution function
FI(x) at point t. With the continuity condition neither type of the UIP has
incentives to deviate:
uGUI = (pUI(G)t− I)− (pUI(B)t− I)
pUI(G)xs(1)− IEGs
pUI(B)xs(1)− IEBs
From the perspective of the IP if he will not distinguish the different types of
the UIP, there will exist an aggregate cumulative distribution function the UIP.
The aggregate cumulative distribution function that makes the IP indifferent
among the bids in his mixing set is:
FUI(x) =
p′(1)x− I − uI
p′(1)x− I
= p(G|s = 1)FGUI(x) + p(B|s = 1)(qBFBUI(x))
The fact that the mixing regions of each type of the UIP are disjoint 54 gives
the unique distribution functions for each type of the UIP:
FGUI(x) =
p′(1)x− I − uI
p(G|s = 1)(p′(x)x− I)
FBUI(x) =
(1− p(G|s = 1))(px− I)− uI
(1− p(G|s = 1))(p′(x)x− I)
The conditions FBUI(1) = 1 and FGUI(t) = 1 give:
t =
p′(1)γ − Ip(G|s = 1)
p′(1)(1− p(G|s = 1))
1− qB =
p′(1)γ − I
(p′(1)− I)(1− p(G|s = 1))
The feasibility conditions on γ and t will define the parametric region of this
equilibrium type which may intersect with the parametric regions found in the
sub-case 1 and sub-case 2. In addition, all these parametric regions do not cover
parametric space completely. For some reporting policies there will not exist an
equilibrium, which is a constraint on the set of reporting policies the mediator
can use.
This completes the second case.
54I do not take into account the common element t, since one can exclude it from the mixing
set of the "B" type without loss of generality.
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Remark. I considered three free parameters for any reporting policy: pUI(B),
pUI(G) and p(G|s = 1). But, there are only two free parameters because the
third one is a function of the other two. So, given pUI(B) and pUI(G), the
parameter p(G|s = 1) will be pinned down.
p(G|s = 1) = (pUI(G)− p
′(0))(p0 − pUI(B))
(p′(1)− p′(0))p(s = 1)(pUI(G)− pUI(B))
p(G|s = 0) = (p
′(1)− pUI(G))(p0 − pUI(B))
(p′(1)− p′(0))p(s = 0)(pUI(G)− pUI(B))
After the equilibrium analysis I can write the expected utility of the IP in
the general way:
UI(s = 1) = ((1− p(G|s = 1))(1− qB) + p(G|s = 1)(1− qG))(p′(1)− I)
In the second part, I will analyse the set of the reporting policies which are
consistent and incentive compatible.
First, the consistency implies that the signal is weakly informative:
pUI(G) ≥ pUI(B)
or
p(G|s = 1) ≥ p(G|s = 0)
It is clear from the form of UI(s = 1) function that it is decreasing with
p(G|s = 1) and (IC) will not be satisfied under any consistent reporting policy
except the uninformative one.
3.7.4 Proof of Claim 6
Proof. As was in Claim 5, there will be some preliminary observations that will
simplify the analysis. I will denote by the XGUI and XBUI the mixing sets of the
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different types of the UIP and by the XHI and XLI the mixing sets of the different
types of the IP. I define XUI = XGUI ∪XBUI and XI = XHI ∪XLI . Following the
Uniqueness part of Claim 1 and Claim 5, it is easy to show that at any equilib-
rium induced by a simple communication mechanism: 1) supXUI = supXI = 1,
2) XUI ∪ {1} = XI , 3) XUI and XI are connected sets,4) The only probability
atom is αI = 1, 5)minXBUI = maxXGI whenever the "B" type bids a non-empty
contract. In addition, minXLI = maxXHI will hold, since a higher posterior of
the "L" type about the message mUI = B, forces him to bid more aggressively
than the "H" type. 55 Given these observations, I proceed to the equilibrium
search part.
First, I consider the case pUI(B) < I
There will be four different types of equilibria depending on the parameter
region.
1) The IP bids unity after the message "L", and mixes in the region [ I
pUI(G)
, 1]
after the message "H". The UIP mixes in the region [ I
pUI(G)
, 1] with probability
qG and bids an empty contract with 1−qG. He gets zero utility in the equilibrium.
For the UIP who received the message "G", the utility will be zero:
UGUI = pUI(G)(s(1)(p(H|G, s = 1)(1−FHI (αUI))+(1−p(H|G, s = 1))))+(1−s(1)))(αUI−I)+
+(1−pUI(G))(s(0)(p(H|G, s = 1)(1−FHI (αUI))+(1−p(H|G, s = 1)))+(1−s(0)))(−I) = 0






, if x < 1
1, x=1
(3.5)
55If this condition does not hold, then there will be a profitable deviation of the "L" type
of the IP. Essentially, it comes from the single crossing condition.
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The parameter restriction which follows from the fact that limx→ 1−0 FHI (x) ≤
1:
p(H|G, s = 1) ≥ pUI(G)− I
pUI(G)s(1)− I(pUI(G)s(1) + (1− pUI(G))s(0))
The utility of the IP after receiving the message "H" and the signal realisa-
tion s = 1:
UHI (s = 1) = ((1−p(G|H, s = 1))+p(G|H, s = 1)((1−qG)+qG(1−FG))))(p′(1)αI−I)
The cumulative distribution function for the UIP that makes the "H" type of
the IP indifferent among his actions αI ∈ [ IpUI(G) , 1]:
FGUI(x) =
p′(1)x− I − uHI













The second parameter restriction for this equilibrium type which follows
from the fact that qG ≤ 1 is:
p(G|H, s = 1) ≥ p
′(1)(pUI(G)− I)
pUI(G)(p′(1)− I)
This parameter restriction tells that the message mI to the IP should be
enough informative, such that it allows the IP to have randomized strategy in
the equilibrium. If this condition is not met, then there is a profitable deviation
of the IP αI = 1.
The expected utility of the IP after the signal realisation s = 1 is:
uI(s = 1) = (1− p(G|s = 1) + p(G|s = 1)(1− qG))(p′(1)− I)
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2) The IP bids unity after the message "L", and mixes in the region [γ, 1]
after the message "H". The UIP mixes in the region [γ, 1] and gets non-negative
utility. The UIP never bids an empty contract.






, if x < 1
1, x=1
(3.6)
And the parameter restriction follows from the fact that limx→ 1−0 FHI (x) ≤
1:
p(H|G, s = 1) ≥ pUI(G)(1− γ)
pUI(G)s(1)− I(1− pUI(G))s(0)− IpUI(G)s(1)
‘
The cumulative distribution function of the UIP :
FGUI(x) =
p′(1)x− I − uHI
p(G|H, s = 1)(p′(1)x− I)
γ will be pinned down by FUI(1) = 1 and will be equal:
γ =
p′(1)− p(G|H, s = 1)(p′(1)− I)
p′(1)
With the parameter restriction following from the fact that γ ≥ I
pUI(G)
:
p(G|H, s = 1) ≤ p
′(1)(pUI(G)− I)
pUI(G)(p′(1)− I)
The expected utility of the IP after the signal s = 1 is:
uI(s = 1) = (1− p(G|s = 1))(p′(1)− I)




, t] after the message "H". The UIP mixes in the region [ I
pUI(G)
, 1]
with probability qG and bids an empty contract with 1− qG.
As was in Claim 5, there will be an aggregate bidding function of the IP from
the perspective of the UIP. The aggregate cumulative distribution function that




This aggregate function should satisfy next equation:
FI = p(H|G, s = 1)FHI + (1− p(H|G, s = 1))FLI
Given that each type of the IP mixes in the disjoint sets 56 , I can uniquely pin
down the cumulative distribution function of each type of the IP:
FHI (x) =
pUI(G)x− I









, if t <x ≤ 1
1, if x=1
(3.7)
To make each type of the IP indifferent among the bids in the correspond-











, if t <x ≤ 1
(3.8)
With the expected utility of the "L" type of the IP after the signal realisation
s = 1:
uLI = (1− qGp(G|L, s = 1))(p′(1)− I)
56I do not take into account the common element t, since one can exclude it from the mixing
set of the "L" type without loss of generality.
93
(qG, t) will be pinned down from the continuity of the FGUI at t 57 and from
the fact that FLI (t) = 0.
qG =
p′(1)(pUI(G)p(G|H, s = 1)(1− t) + pUI(G)p(G|L, s = 1)t− p(G|L, s = 1)I)
(p′(1)− I)pUI(G)p(G|H, s = 1)p(G|L, s = 1)
t =
I(1− p(H|G, s = 1)EGs)
pUI(G)(1− p(H|G, s = 1)s(1))
The set of parameters of this equilibrium type will have an intersection with the
set of parameters of the equilibrium types 1 and 2.
The expected utility of the IP after the signal realisation s = 1 will be:




+p(L|s = 1)(1− p(G|L, s = 1) + p(G|L, s = 1)(1− qG))(p′(1)− I) =
= p(B|s = 1)(p(H|B, s = 1)(p′(1) I
pUI(G)
− I) + p(L|B, s = 1)(p′(1)− I))+
+p(G|s = 1)(p(H|G, s = 1)(p′(1) I
pUI(G)
− I) +p(L|G, s = 1)(1− qG)(p′(1)− I))
4) The IP mixes in the region [t, 1] after the message "L", and mixes in the
region [γ, t] after the message "H". The UIP mixes in the region [γ, 1] and gets
a non-negative utility. The UIP never bids an empty contract.
The only thing which will change in the cumulative distribution function of





p(G|H,s=1)(p′(1)x−I) , if γ <x < t
p′(1)x−I−uLI
p(G|L,s=1)(p′(1)x−I) , if t <x < 1
(3.9)
The conditions on the cumulative distribution function FGUI(1) = 1 and FGUI(γ) =
0 will give two conditions on the utility levels of the IP:
uHI = p
′(1)γ − I
57This condition guarantees that there is no deviations of the "L" type of the IP.
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uLI = (1− p(G|L, s = 1))(p′(1)− I)
Another condition that guarantees no deviation of the IP is a continuity of the
cumulative distribution function FUI(x) at the point t which gives an expression
for γ:
γ =
p(G|H, s = 1)uLI + p′(1)p(G|L, s = 1)t− p(G|H, s = 1)(p′(1)t− I)
p′(1)p(G|L, s = 1)
The conditions on the cumulative function of the IP FHI (γ) = 0 and FLI (t) =
0 will give:




p(H|G, s = 1)EGs
(1− p(H|G, s = 1)s(1))
The feasibility restrictions on (γ, t) are defining the set of parameter values that
has an intersection with the set of parameters of the equilibrium types 1 and 2.
The expected utility of the IP after the signal realisation s = 1 will be:
uI(s = 1) = p(H|s = 1)(p′γ−I)+(1−p(H|s = 1))(1−p(G|L, s = 1))(p′(1)−I) =
= p(B|s = 1)(p(H|B, s = 1)(p′(1)γ − I) + p(L|B, s = 1)(p′(1)− I))+
+p(G|s = 1)(p(H|G, s = 1)(p′(1)γ − I))
The second case is pUI(B) ≥ I.
The first and the third types of equilibria from the previous case with their
parametric regions will not change, since "B" type of the UIP will not have any
deviations from a non-bidding strategy.
For the equilibria types 2 and 4, I need to add another restrictions on the
parameters which guarantee that there are no deviations from the "B" type.
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The additional parameter restriction for the equilibrium type 2 will be:
p′(1)(pUI(B)− I)(pUI(G)s(1)− IEGs)
pUI(G)(p′(1)− I)(pUI(B)s(1)− IEBs)
≤ p(G|H, s = 1)




I(pUI(G)− pUI(B))(s(1)− s(0))(1− I)
pUI(G)(pUI(B)s(1)− IEBs)
There will exist equilibria of other types.
In the fifth type of equilibrium, the IP bids unity after the message "L", and
mixes in the region [γ, 1] after the message "H". The UIP mixes in the region
[t, 1] after the message "B", and mixes in the region [γ, t] after the message "G".
The expected utility of the IP after the signal s = 1 will be:
uI(s = 1) = (1− p(G|s = 1))(1− qB)(p′(1)− I)
In the sixth type of equilibrium, The IP mixes in the region [tI , 1] after the
message "L", and mixes in the region [γ, tI ] after the message "H". The IP
mixes in the region [tU , 1] after the message "B", and mixes in the region [γ, tU ]
after the message "G". The expected utility of the IP after the signal s = 1 is:
uI(s = 1) = p(B|s = 1)(p(H|B, s = 1)(p′(1)γ−I)+p(L|B, s = 1)(1−qB)(p′(1)−I))+
+p(G|s = 1)(p(H|G, s = 1)(p′(1)γ − I))
I do not explicitly analyse these types of equilibria in the claim.
The first and the second parts of the claim follow from the preliminary
observations and the equilibria types. Preliminary observations also exclude a
possibility of other types of equilibria.
The third part of the proof. For the first type of equilibrium the expected
utility of the IP after the signal realisation equal to 1 is:
uI(s = 1) = (1− p(G|s = 1) + p(G|s = 1)(1− qG))(p′(1)− I)
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I will consider the deviation of the IP such that he submits the signal reali-
sation s = 0 when the true realisation is s = 1. I will consider the deviation of
the IP such that his actions after "H" and "L" will remain the same (as in the
case when s = 1).58 The utility of the IP under the mentioned deviation will
be:
uI(m = 0|s = 1) = (1− p(G|s = 0) + p(G|s = 0)(1− qG))(p′(1)− I)
which is strictly higher than the original utility under truth-telling, because for
the informative reporting policy p(G|s = 0) < p(G|s = 1) should hold. The
cases for the equilibrium types two and five will be similar. So, it cannot be
the case that the "L" type is bidding according to the degenerate probability
distribution.
3.7.5 Proof of Claim 7
Proof. 1) I consider the expected utility of the IP under the deviation m = 0 if
the true signal realisation is s = 1. The reporting function p(mI |mUI , s = 0) is
important only for the punishment of the IP if he decides to deviate from the
truth-telling. In the case of the signal realisation s = 0 this reporting function
is payoff irrelevant. So, the primary motive of the mediator is to punish the
deviator as much as possible. One can consider the choice of an optimal action
by the IP in the case of deviation from truth-telling as a decision problem where
mUI serves as a state which perfectly predicts the action of the UIP and mI
serves as a signal about the state. So, the uninformative signal p(mI |mUI , s = 0)
will be an optimal punishment for the IP in the case of deviation from truth-
telling. Fully uninformative reporting policy p(mI |mUI , s = 0) may not be the
only optimal punishment.
2) Without loss of generality consider type 3 of equilibrium. Under truth-
telling when s = 1, αI = t is an optimal action for both types of the IP, so the
expected utility of the IP under truth-telling:
58This may be a sub-optimal deviation of the IP.
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uI(m = 1|s = 1) = (p(G|s = 1)(1− FUI(t)) + (1− p(G|s = 1)))(t− I)
Under the deviation (m = 0), the utility will be at least:
uI(m = 0|s = 1) = (p(G|s = 0)(1− FUI(t)) + (1− p(G|s = 0)))(t− I)
The utility under lying is strictly higher due to p(G|s = 0) < p(G|s = 1) for
an informative reporting policy. The only case when it is equal is the case of
the uninformative signal p(G|s = 0) = p(G|s = 1). For the equilibrium types 4
and 6, the logic is similar. The crucial step in the proof is the fact that αI = t
is an optimal action for both of the types of the IP.
3.7.6 Proof of Claim 8
Proof. The third part. Imagine that the second type of the equilibrium is
induced both after "H" and "L". Then under informative reporting policy, the
IP would gain if he lies about signal realisation s = 1. Since p(G|s = 1) >
p(G|s = 0), there will always exist such a deviation.
The forth part. Define:
(1− q)(mI) := p(G|mI , s = 1)(1− qG) + p(B|mI , s = 1)(1− qB)
. Imagine that (1− q)(H) > (1− q)(L), then if p(H|s = 1) < p(H|s = 0) there
will always exists a deviation of the IP from truth-telling. The IP will say m = 0
about the signal realisation and bid αI = 1, his utility will be strictly higher
because of more frequent non-bidding behaviour after "H".
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